THE BASIC CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

Adharchandra Mookerjee Lectures, 1932

THE BASIC CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

BY

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PREFACE

The following few pages were written as Adharchandra Mookerjee Lectures (in Arts) for the year 1932, in the University of Calcutta. An attempt has been made here to show the solution that the Buddha found out of the problem he had before him. The problem which is, in fact, common to all religious or philosophical systems of the country is the cessation of sufferings, which follows the extinction of desire, as declared by the sages of the Upaniṣads. The Buddha accepted the view, but differing diametrically from them as regards the means he took a very bold step and advocated the doctrine of *Anātman*. And yet he arrived at the same destination.

I am thankful to those of my friends and pupils who have helped me in one or the other way. My thanks are also due to Mr. Jayantilal Acharya, B.A., one of the students who work with us in our Vidyābhavana, for preparing the Indexes.

VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA.

VISVABHARATI, SANTINIKETAN,
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THE BASIC CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

LECTURE I

INTRODUCTORY

Before coming to the actual points I desire to discuss in these lectures, let us take a bird's-eye view of the religious and philosophical speculations in the country that preceded the advent of the Buddha, so that we may be in a position to appreciate the message that he delivered to the world.

First of all we see in the field those who were subsequently known as *Karmins* 'the performers of (religious) actions,' or *Yājñikas* 'sacrificers.' They were ritualists advocating various sacrifices and ceremonials as the means not only of enjoyments and pleasures here and hereafter, but also of salvation or immortality. They used to sing in this strain (RV, VIII. 48·3) : 'We have drunk the juice of Soma and become immortal. We have attained to effulgence and have known the gods. What can an enemy do to us? What decay can affect an immortal being?' According to the description given by the great author of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, they were given to lust, and paradise was their goal,

> " Where joy and pleasures and gladness
> And rapture dwell, where the wish
> Of the wisher finds fulfilment."

The word *karma* meant to them sacrifices, rites, and ceremonials as found in the Vedic texts.

And necessarily they had to accept or find out some doctrine or law with regard to the relation between karma and its effect or reward. They had such faith in its power that there was no place whatever for God ; everything being done in their system through the agency of sacrifices ; though they invoked a number of deities in the course of the performance of their rites and ceremonials.

And it goes without saying that they had a belief in the existence of the Self (*Ātman*) as something quite distinct from the body, and in that Self moving from this world to the other in order to reap the fruits of one's action.

Now, there came in a change which was very remarkable. There was a new school of thinkers. We know them as *Jñānins* 'endowed with knowledge,' or 'followers of the path of knowledge' (*jñāna-mārga*). They are better known to us as Vedāntins. They lost their faith in those rituals and ceremonials. They regarded the sacrifices as frail rafts (*plavā hy ete adṛḍhā yajñarūpāḥ*) by which one can hardly cross the ocean of the saṃsāra. They said : "Fools are they who praise this (*karma*) as the highest good. They are subject again and again to old age and death. Fools dwelling in ignorance, wise in their own conceit, and puffed up with vain knowledge, go round and round staggering to and fro, like blind men led by the blind." [1]

[1] Mu. Up., I. 2. 7-8.

They thought that nothing permanent could be gained by those rites and sacrifices, and declared that as here on the earth whatever has been acquired by exertion perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired for the next world by sacrifices and other good actions performed on the earth.[2]

. As is quite natural, they wanted something permanent on which they could peacefully rest for ever. But what was that thing and where? They felt that it was something not outside of but in themselves. It was not created or acquired, but ever existent, and as such was only to be perceived and realized. And that was nothing but one's own Self (*Ātman*).

This Self is identical with the cosmic Self that pervades the universe as does the salt in the water in which it has been dissolved, that dwells in the earth, being within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who operates in the earth, and is thus the indwelling ruler, the immortal.

And they insisted : " Know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words ! He is the bridge of the immortal."[3]

All their thoughts centred round the Self (Br. Up., I.4.8). " Who is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else, and

[2] Chā. Up., VIII. 1. 6.

[3] tam evaikam ātmānaṃ jānatha, anyā vāco vimuñcatha, amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ. Mu. Up., II. 2.5.

nearer than anything. And if one were to say to one who declares another than the Self dearer, that he will lose what is dearer to him, very likely it would be so. Let him worship the Self alone as dear, the object of his love will never perish."

And they said that he who knows the Self overcomes grief (Ch. Up., VII. 1. 3). The Self is a bank (*setu*), a boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded. Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old age, death and grief, neither good nor evil deeds. All evil turns back from it, for the world of Brahman is free from all evil (Ch. Up., VIII. 4. 1).

This Ātman was held by them as "the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all,"[4] from whom there is the origination of the world, by whom it remains sustained, and in whom it disappears in the end.

Mark here also the difference between the Yājñikas and the Vedāntins with regard to the conception of the Self. While the former hold it simply to be distinct from the body, the latter though agreeing with them on this point maintains its other characteristics as shown above.

Following this train of thought these teachers, *viz.* the Vedāntins, naturally came to think that it was knowledge (*vidyā*) and the extinction of

[4] sarvasya vaśī sarvasyeśānaḥ sarvasyādhipatiḥ. Br. Up., IV. 4. 22.

desire (*kāma-kṣaya*) through which one can attain to salvation. And they actually declared: "By knowledge one obtains immortality."[5] And as regards the consequence of desire we are told (Br. Up., IV. 4) that "A person consists of desires, and as is his desire, so is his will; and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap." And another verse declares: "To whatever object a man's own mind is attached, to that he goes strenuously together with his deed; and having attained the end (*i.e.* the last results) of whatever deed he does here on the earth, he returns again from that world (which is the temporary reward of his deed) to this world of action. So much for the man who desires. But as to the man who does not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desire, or desires the Self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere, being Brahman he goes to Brahman. On this there is this verse: 'When all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman.' "[6]

And it is said (Br. Up., IV. 4. 22) further: "Knowing this, the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do, they said,

[5] vidyayā vindate'mṛtam. Kena Up., II. 4.

[6] yadā sarve pramuñcyante kāmā ye'sya hṛdi sthitāḥ |
atha martyo'mṛto bhavaty atra brahma samaśnute ||

we who have this Self and this world. And they having risen above the desire for son, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds wander about as mendicants (*bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti*)."

Thus quite unlike the Yājñikas they would rise above all kinds of desire, renounce the world, and live in the forests, or wander about as mendicants, in pursuit of the knowledge of the Self.

There was, however, an intermediatory or conciliatory school that attempted to compromise these two extreme views, that is, the views of the Yājñikas and the Vedāntists, maintaining that neither action (*karman*) which is interpreted as *avidyā* 'not-knowledge' nor *vidyā* 'knowledge' can do anything independently, but the combination of both of them is required for attaining the goal. For they say, it is action (*avidyā* 'not-knowledge') by which one can overcome death, but to attain immortality depends on knowledge (Īśa Up., 11).

Be that as it may, as regards the means of knowledge of the Self, it was mainly *yoga*. There are strong grounds for holding the view that it was highly developed in that age. A knowledge of the fine nerve-system which is so necessary for practising *yoga* seems to have been possessed by those teachers to some extent.

Now as these or similar accounts of the Yājñikas and Vedāntists are recorded in the Vedic texts, naturally in course of time these texts came to be

regarded as the supreme authority in regard to spiritual matters, and nothing could be accepted without their sanction. This implicit faith in the authority of the Vedas has played a great part in moulding the religious speculations in our country which we are not here concerned with directly.

Gradually, the authority of the Vedas began to lose its hold. Following in the path of the believers in knowledge the school of Sāṅkhyas came into being. They declared the Vedic rites as impure being associated with the killing of animals, and as such they could not bring about one's salvation or the complete cessation of all kinds of suffering. Thus though the Sāṅkhyas discarded the Vedic rites altogether, they drew much of the materials for their system from that part of the Vedic texts which specially deals with knowledge. They accepted the theory of Ātman, though in a modified way. But there was no place for God in their system. They believed in the origination and dissolution of the world, but for that they felt no necessity for accepting the existence of God, both of the facts being explained in a different way.

Now there soon appeared in the field teachers after teachers, and thinkers after thinkers, who professed to have discovered, quite independently of the Vedic tradition, new paths of salvation and attracted people round them. The authority of

the Vedas having been discarded there was nothing that could check one's freedom of thought. They had absolute liberty of their conscience. Among these teachers and thinkers there were both Brahmans and non-Brahmans. There were various sects, and sects were added to sects maintaining different views, such as : the world and the soul are eternal; they are partly eternal and partly not; or in some cases they are eternal, while in others they are not; the world is finite or infinite; the world and the soul arise without cause; the soul after death is conscious, or unconscious; there is a destruction or annihilation of a living being; as the things are momentary there cannot be any action, and so even there is no soul, much less the question of its being eternal or non-eternal; action is quite possible and so it can be held that the soul and such other things are ever existent; it is only disciplines through which one can attain salvation; knowledge brings about one's bondage, for where there is knowledge there are discussions among the disputants giving rise to dissentions which soil one's mind ; on the other hand, from not-knowledge (*ajñāna*) there is no possibility of such danger; and it is impossible to ascertain what is knowledge, as the philosophers differ on this point; there is no consequence whatsoever of good or evil actions; the origination of the world is from time, or nature, or Primeval Cause (*prakṛti*),

and so on;—too many even to mention. The upholders of these doctrines have all offered their grounds which, however, cannot be gone into in full here. Besides, there were various ascetics holding different religious views and practising severe forms of austerity or self-mortification, for instance, taking food just after the mode of cows, or taking no food at all, or living only on leaves of trees, or moss or on water, remaining in water, and so on, undoubtedly with a view to having the complete control over the senses.[7]

These philosophers and ascetics, recluses and Brāhmans often with a large number of followers, moving from one part of the country to another, used to discuss philosophical and religious matters in such a way that the period was, in fact, a period of Indian dialecticians after the classical period of Brahmanical speculation.

At this time when the country was seething with such religious and philosophical speculations and discussions, Gautama Buddha appeared upon the scene, and with him was Mahāvīra, the last Tīrthaṅkara of the Jainas, with whom, however, we are not here concerned.

The first thing that strikes one most in the personality of the Buddha is that he was an out

[7] The utter futility of such attempts is shown by the author of the *Bhagavadgītā* (II. 59) saying that the objects of senses may turn away from a man who does not take food, but not his desire for them.

and out rationalist, and that seems to have been mainly due to the atmosphere in which he was born. He would not like to give anything as dogmatic truth, but always based his views on the strong ground of reason. He is reported once to have said to Kālāmas: "This I have said to you, O Kālāmas, but you may accept it not because it is a report, not because it is a tradition, not because it is so said in the past, not because it is given from (our) basket (or scripture, *piṭaka*), not for the sake of discussion, nor for the sake of a particular method, nor for the sake of careful consideration, nor for the sake of the forbearance with wrong views, nor because it appears to be suitable, nor because your preceptor is a recluse, but if, you yourselves understand that this is so meritorious and blameless, and when accepted, is for benefit and happiness, then you may accept it." [8] The Buddha also declaıed to his followers :

[8] AN., III. 653: iti kho kālāmā yaṃ taṃ avocumha —ettha tumhe Kālāmā mā anussavena mā paramparāya mā itikirāya vā mā piṭakasampadānena mā takkahetu mā nayahetu ākāra-parivitakkena mā diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā mā bhavyarūpatāya mā samaṇo no garū ti, yadā tumhe Kālāmā attanā va jāneyyātha—ime dhammā kusalā ime dhammā anavajjā ime dhammā viññuppasatthā ime dhammā samattā samādinnā hitāya sukhāya saṃvattantī-ti—atha tumhe Kālāmā upasampajja vihareyyāthā ti—iti yaṃ taṃ vuttaṃ idam etam paṭicca vuttaṃ.

"As the wise take gold by cutting, burning, and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone), so, O Bhikṣus, you are to accept my words having examined them and not merely out of your regard for me." [9]

He used also to say to his disciples that in ascertaining truth "A Bodhisattva rests on reasons (*yukti-saraṇa*) [10] and not on a person (*pudgala-saraṇa*) though things might be explained by an

[9] tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ |
parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyam madvaco na tu gauravāt ||
Jñānasāra-samuccaya, 31.

The original Sanskrit of the *Jñānasāra-samuccaya* which is attributed to Āryadeva is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan translation by Upādhyāya Kṛṣṇarava of India and Bhikṣu Dharmaprajña (Chos kyi śes rab) of Tibet. See Tanjur, mdo, tsha, fol. 26 ; Cordier, III, p. 298. In Tibetan it is called *Ye śes sñiṅ po kun las buts pa*. It is a collection of only thirty-eight kārikās some of which are found quoted in the *Subhāṣitasaṅgraha*. The above kārikā in Sanskrit is quoted in TSP., pp. 12, 878, and the Tibetan version in the *Grammar of the Tibetan Language* of Csoma de Körös, 1834, p. 168. *Cf.* the following couplet embodying the attitude of Haribhadra:

pakṣapāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu |
yuktimad vacanaṃ yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ ||

'I have no partiality for Mahāvīra, nor have I any aversion to Kapila and others; but he whose words are reasonable is to be accepted.'

[10] Sometimes instead of °*saraṇa* the reading is °*śaraṇa*. See *Dharmasaṅgraha*, LIII. In fact, the meaning is the same.

Elder (*sthavira*), or an experienced man, or Tathāgata, or the Order (*sangha*). Thus resting on reason and not on a person he does not move away from the truth, nor does he follow the faith of others." [11]

There is another thing to be specially marked in the Buddha, which is that he was very practical. He wanted action and not mere speculations which can in no way lead one to the goal. As a physician prescribes a medicine neither more nor less than what is absolutely necessary, just so the Blessed One even when pressed hard would rather keep silent than say what could not serve the purpose of the inquirer. We may recall here his dialogues regarding the things which he did not explain though he was repeatedly asked to do so.[12] For a ready reference I may give you here a summary :

In that age there were some theories in the country which were agitating the minds of the

[11] *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. xvii (AK, IX. 246) :
punar bodhisattvaḥ° prajānan yuktipratisaraṇo bhavati na sthavireṇābhijñānena vâ pudgalena tathāgatena vā saṅghena vā ime dharmā bhāṣitā iti pudgala-saraṇo bhavati. sa evaṃ yuktipratisaraṇo no pudgalapratisaraṇas tattvārthān na vicalati aparapratyayaśca bhavati.

Sometimes for *yukti°* we have *dharma°* 'truth.' MVt, § 74 : dharmapratisaraṇena bhavitavyaṃ na pudgala-pratisaraṇena.

[12] MN, Vol. I, pp. 426 ff., 483 ff.; SN (*Avyākata Saṃyutta*), Vol. IV, pp. 374 ff.

people, *viz.* the world is eternal, the world is not eternal; the world is finite, the world is infinite; the soul is one thing and the body another; the saint[13] exists after death, the saint does not exist after death; the saint neither exists, nor does not exist after death.

These questions were put to the Blessed One on many occasions and by many a man, but he never elucidated them and remained silent. One Mālunkyāputta who was leading a religious life under him was determined to have a definite reply either in the affirmative or in the negative to those questions and resolved that if the Blessed One did not give him such reply he would abandon his religious training under him.

The Blessed One said that he did not ask Mālunkyāputta to take his training under him on the condition that he would elucidate those particular questions to him, nor did Mālunkyāputta say to the Blessed One that he would take his training under the Buddha on condition that those particular questions would be elucidated to him by the Blessed One. He told Mālunkyāputta further that if he insisted upon it he might die before the questions could be solved. For it was just like a man wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, for whom a physician was procured by

[13] *Tathāgata*, according to Buddhaghoṣa, in such cases means *jiva*, *i.e.* 'soul.'

his friends and relatives. Now, if the sick man said that he would not have the arrow taken out until he knew whether the man by whose arrow he was wounded belonged to the warrior caste, or to the Brahman caste, or to other castes; or the name of the person who wounded him; or whether the man who wounded him was tall, or short or of medium stature ; or black, or dusky, or of yellow skin; or from this or that village, or town, or city ; or whether the shaft was feathered from the wings of a vulture, or of a heron, and so on; that man would certainly die without having learnt all these details. Exactly in the same way one who insists on the solution of these questions would die before they could be answered.

The Blessed One further said that the religious life does not depend on the elucidation of these problems, for there still remain "birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair."

Thus it is perfectly clear from the above that such discussion, the Buddha held, does not serve any practical purpose, for it does not conduce to "aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, wisdom, and Nirvāṇa." And so whenever he was asked to give his definite reply to those questions he kept silent. And it is related that the wandering teacher Vacchagotta, one of the inquirers, was so satisfied with the reply

given by the Master, that he begged to be accepted as a disciple.

Again, the Buddha gave another reason for his silence with regard to such questions: it was this that he had sufficient ground for thinking that there was every possibility of his reply, if given, being not understood, or misunderstood by the enquirer. Moreover, consistently with his own doctrine of the Middle Path[14] he could not give his reply either in the affirmative or in the negative. For, if it was in the former it would be eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*), while in the latter it would be nihilism (*ucchedavāda*).[15] But he accepted neither of them, as his doctrine is free from both of them.[16]

[14] There are two Middle Paths (*madhyamā pratipad*): one avoiding the two extremes, the attachment to the worldly enjoyments (*kāmesu kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) and self-mortification (*attakilamathānuyoga*) as preached by the Blessed One in the *Dhammacakkapavattanasutta*; and the other avoiding the two extremes or points (*antas* or *koṭis*), such as 'it is' and 'it is not' (*asti* and *nāsti*); 'it is eternal' and 'it is not eternal' (*nitya* and *anitya*); 'it is ātman' and 'it is not ātman' (*ātman* and *anātman*), and so on. See MK, XV. 7:

kātyāyanāvavāde ca asti nāstīti cobhayam ।
pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā ॥

See also MV, p. 269; SN, II, p. 17; KP, § 60.

[15] MK, XV. 10; *Catustava*, III (*Acintyastava*). 21;

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstītyucchedadarśanam ।

[16] śāśvatocchedanirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ saugatasammatam. AS, p. 62.

This attitude of the Buddha was found even at the time of his preaching his first sermon. He was unwilling to expound the truth that he had realized under the Bodhi tree, knowing that it was so subtle that men would not be able to grasp it. This is said very clearly in the *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 114, where we know that the people would not understand the truth and so in order not to frighten them the Tathāgatas did not elucidate the questions.[17]

Attempts have been made to explain this silence of the Buddha by modern scholars and it

[17] evamādyenottarottarakramalakṣaṇavidhināvyākṛtāti pṛṣṭāḥ sthāpanīyaṃ bhagavatāvyākṛtam iti vakṣyanti, na tu te mohapuruṣā evaṃ jñāsyanti yathā śrotṛṇāṃ buddhivaikalpāt, tathagatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhā uttrāsapadavivarjanārthaṃ sattvānāṃ na vyākurvanti. avyākṛtāny api ca mahāmate tīrthakaradṛṣṭivādavyudāsārthaṃ nopadiśyante tathāgataiḥ. tīrthakarā hi mahāmate evaṃvādino yad uta sa jīvas taccharīram anyo jīvo'nyac charīram - ity evamādye 'vyākṛtavādaḥ. tīrthakarāṇāṃ hi mahāmate kāraṇavisammūḍhānām avyākṛtam, na tu matpravacane. matpravacane tu grāhyagrāhakavisaṃyukte vikalpo na pravartate. teṣāṃ kathaṃ sthāpyaṃ bhavet. ye tu mahāmate grāhyagrāhakābhiniviṣṭāḥ svacittadṛśyamātrānavadhāritamatayas teṣāṃ sthāpyaṃ bhavati. caturvidha-padapraśnavyākaraṇena mahāmate tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhāḥ sattvebhyo dharmaṃ deśayanti. sthāpanīyam iti mahāmate kālāntaradeśanaiṣā mayā kṛtāparipakvendriyāṇām na tu paripakvendriyāṇāṃ sthāpyaṃ bhavati.

See also TS with its *Pañjikā*, verse 348 (p. 129).

was also a subject of keen discussion among ancient teachers. The question is: Did the Buddha himself know the answers to those questions? Was his silence due to his own ignorance, or is it that he knew the solution of the problems, but did not expound for the reasons given above? Now, can we ever rightly think that the Buddha himself did not reach any definite decision about the problems and hence he kept silent? If so, what could he gain by concealing the truth? None can imagine that such a teacher as the Buddha could conceal his ignorance, lest his disciples should lose their implicit faith in him. It is evident from his dialogue with Māluṅkyāputta, that he did not care for it. Whether one took his training under him or not was nothing to him. He definitely declared that he had elucidated what are misery, its origin, its cessation, and the way thereof and the followers were to act upon it, if they really wanted to be free from all kinds of misery.

The Blessed One is reported (DN, II, p. 100) to have said the following to Ānanda when the former was on his deathbed:

"I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine (*anantaram abāhiram katvā*), for in respect of truth, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the 'closed fist of a teacher'[18] who keeps something back."

[18] It was an old custom in the country and is still prevalent here and there that it was at the last stage of

Why then did he not elucidate the problems referred to above? Because, if he did so there would be a dilemma, and, in fact, it was presented in the *Milindapañha* (IV. 2.4) by the king saying that the silence of the Buddha might be due either to his ignorance or to his wish to conceal something. But Nāgasena who was certainly representing the views of his predecessors and contemporaries was quite competent to meet his opponent. He said that not every question deserves to be answered. For it is held that there are four kinds of questions, *viz.* (*i*) *ekāmśa-vyākaraṇīya* 'that which can be explained with certainty or categorically,' *e.g.* 'Will every one who is born die?' 'Yes' is the reply. (*ii*) *vibhajya-vyākaraṇīya* 'that which is to be explained by making a division,' *e.g.* 'Is every one reborn after death?' The reply is: 'One free from passions (*kleśas*) is not reborn, but one who is not so is reborn.' (*iii*) *pratipṛcchāvyākaraṇīya* 'that which is to be explained by putting another question,' *e.g.* 'Is man superior or inferior?' It is necessary here to ask: 'In relation to what?' 'If in relation to animals, he is superior. But if in relation to gods, he is inferior.' And (*iv*) *sthāpanīya* 'that which is to be set aside,' *e.g.* 'Are

one's life that one would tell one's favourite son or disciple the most secret thing. This is called 'the closed fist of a teacher' (*ācariyamuṭṭhi*, *ācāryamuṣṭi*).

the *skandhas* the same as the living being (*sattva*)?' This question is not to be answered. For, according to Buddhists, there is nothing known as a living being. And so the question is like the question: 'Is the son of a barren woman black or white?'[19]

And the problems alluded to above are, in fact, the problems of the last kind, *i.e.* those that are to be set aside. And why? Because these are things that cannot be explained by mere words. The differences in the degree of sweetness of milk, sugar, honey, and such other things can in no way be expressed even by *Sarasvatī*, the presiding deity of learning, even though thousands of years are granted to her for doing so. It is to be realized by a man by his own experience. To the Vedāntists this is not a new thing. The seers say (Kena Up., I. 2-4): "The eye does not go thither, nor speech, nor mind. We do not know, we do not understand how one can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown, thus we have heard from those of old who taught us this."

[19] AK, V, 22:

[ekāṃśena vibhāgena pṛcchātaḥ sthāpanīyataḥ ।
vyākṛtaṃ] maraṇotpattiviśiṣṭātmānyatādivat ॥

See LA, pp. 116, 280; MVt, § 86; DN, III, 229; AN, I. 197, II, 46; MP, p. 144; Vyāsa's commentary on *Yoga-sūtras*, IV. 33.

We are further told by the same sages (Kena Up., II. 3): "It is known to him who thinks that it is not known to him, while he who thinks that he knows it does not understand it."[20]

They say again (Taitti. Up., II. 4. 1): "Speeches turn back from it with the mind." And so it is found in a Vedic passage quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* (III. 2. 17) that once when Bāṣkalin approached a teacher, Bādhva by name, and requested him to teach him the truth of *Ātman*, Bādhva kept silence. But when pressed by Bāṣkalin twice or thrice he said: 'Verily I tell you, but you understand not, the Self is calm (*brūmaḥ khalu tvaṃ tu na vijānāsi upaśānto'yam ātmā*).' The same idea of explaining truth by silence is described in a very beautiful way in a stanza of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* attributed to Śaṅkara:

citraṃ vaṭataror mūle vṛddhaḥ
śiṣyo gurur yuvā ।
guros tu maunaṃ vyākhyānaṃ
śiṣyas tu chinnasaṃśayaḥ ॥

[20] *Cf.* śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ ।
yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭiḥs tān asādhyān babhāṣire ॥

It is quoted in Candrakīrtti's commentary on *Catuḥśataka*, Visvabharati, p. 272; BAP, p. 414; SS, pp. 25-26; *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka*, GOS, p. 478.

It means that *śūnyatā* is declared by the Jinas as a remedy for getting rid of all wrong views. But those who have the view of *śūnyatā*, *i.e.* the strong adherence

'It is wonderful that there under a Banyan tree the disciple is old, while the preceptor is young. The explanation of the preceptor is silence, but the doubts of the disciple are removed!'

Remember here the very well-known words of the Upaniṣad with regard to the Self: "*sa eṣa neti nety ātmā agṛhyo na hi gṛhyate*"[21]—'This ātman can only be described by "no no!" He is incomprehensible, for He cannot be comprehended.' It is for this fact that the sages declared: 'Wonderful is the man that can speak of Him, and wonderful is also the man who can understand Him.'[22]

This idea of silence has its fullest expression also in the Buddhist works. We are repeatedly told that the truth revealed to the Buddha cannot be expressed by mere *akṣaras* or letters, as the following passage will show:

'How is it that the truth which has no letter (for its expression) should be taught and heard? Yet, it is through attribution that it is taught and heard.'[23]

(*abhiniveśā*) to *śūnyatā*, are said by them incurable.

[21] Bṛ. Up., III. 9.26; IV. 2.4; 4.22.

[22] Kaṭha Up., I. 2.7: āścaryo vaktā° āścaryo jñātā. See also *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 29.

[23] anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā ı
śrūyate deśyate cāpi samāropād anakṣaraḥ ıı

It is further said in the *Laṅkāvatāra* (p. 144) that between the day of his realization of the supreme knowledge (*bodhi*) and that of his *parinirvāṇa*, the Buddha uttered not a single word. Basing his arguments on these and similar passages Candrakīrtti, the great commentator of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* arrives at the conclusion that for the noble the highest or transcendental truth is silence.[24] It means, according to him, that saints remain silent about the *paramārtha*. This is clearly mentioned in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 16 : 'Silent are the Tathāgatas, O Blessed One, and as such he did not say it.'[25] It is further said in the same work (p. 294) that the *paramārtha* has, in fact, no words (for its expression).[26] And we come across the same

Quoted as the speech of the Blessed One in MV, p. 264; BAP, p. 365. See also MV, pp. 348, 429:

yo 'pi ca cintayi śūnyaka dharmān
so 'pi kumārgapapannaku bālaḥ ।
akṣarakīrttita śūnyaka dharmāḥ
te ca anakṣara akṣara uktāḥ ॥

'That man, too, who thinks all things to be void in essence is foolish and has gone astray. The things which are void are described in letters; but in fact they have no letters (for their description), yet they are described in letters.'

[24] paramārtho hy āryāṇāṃ tūṣṇīmbhāvaḥ. MV, p. 56.

[25] na maunais tathagatair bhāṣitam, maunā hi bhagavaṃs tathāgatāḥ.

[26] paramārthas tv anakṣaraḥ.

view also in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (VI. 7. 98) when it says that the transcendental truth cannot be expressed, as it is beyond the range of speech.[27] This is why the truth (*tattva*) according to the Mādhyamikas is said to be free from all the four points of expression (*catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam*), *viz.* 'it is,' 'it is not,' 'both' and 'not both.' And thus they declare in the words of Nāgārjuna (MK, XV. 24): 'Nowhere and to nobody has ever anything been preached by the Buddha.'[28]

Be that as it may, the Buddha was a speaker of truth (*dharmavādin*), and as such he had no quarrel with any person, though unfortunately the people had occasion for complaining against him unjustly. Thus he is reported to have said once: 'I do not quarrel, O Bhikkhus, with the people, but it is the people who quarrel with me. One, O Bhikkhus, who speaks the truth does not quarrel with any one.'[29]

He used to teach what he had realized through his own experience.[30] And the truth he preached was so clear and efficacious that it was known to the people as the doctrine of *ehipassika*, meaning thereby that it invites every

[27] paramārthas tv asaṃlāpyo gocaro vacasāṃ na saḥ.

[28] na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ.

[29] MV, p. 370: loko mayā sārdhaṃ vivadati nāha lokena sārdhaṃ vivadāmi. See SN, III, p. 138: na bhikkhave dhammavādī kenaci lokasmiṃ vivadati.

[30] sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā. DN, III, p. 76.

man to come and see for himself.[31] And as the consequence of following this truth was visible even in one's present life it was described by the people as 'one belonging to this life' (*sandiṭṭhika* = *sāṃdṛṣṭika*). His doctrine was beautiful in the beginning, beautiful in the middle, and beautiful in the end.

But what did he elucidate during the last forty-nine years of his life after the realization of *samyaksambodhi* ? He elucidated what was the fundamental object of the religious and philosophical speculations of his time, *viz.* the four cardinal considerations : (*i*) that which is to be escaped (*heya*), (*ii*) the cause of that which is to be escaped (*heyahetu*), (*iii*) the escape (*hāna*), and (*iv*) the means of escape (*hānopāya*). And these are (*i*) misery, (*ii*) cause of misery, (*iii*) cessation of misery and (*iv*) the means of the cessation of misery, respectively. These are generally compared with (*i*) disease, (*ii*) the cause of disease, (*iii*) health (*ārogya*), and (*iv*) remedy (*bhaiṣajya*), respectively in the medical science.[32] The Blessed One himself raised the question : 'What have I elucidated ? ' and answered as above. And why did he

[31] DN, II, p. 217; *Visuddhimagga*, p. 216: ehi passa imaṃ dhammam ti evam pavattam ehi-passa-vidham arahatiti.

[32] *Yogasūtra*, Comm. of Vyāsa, II. 15; *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, Comm. of *Vijñānabhikṣu*, I. 1 (Introduction); *Nyāyasūtra*, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, I. 1. 1.

elucidate this? Because this brings profit, has to do with the fundamentals of religion, and leads to *nirvāṇa*.

This is very easy to understand, but when the question arises about the matter of details, one is simply bewildered at the sight of the variety and extent of the records which are supposed to contain all that he taught, as well as what is said of him or his teachings by teachers and writers after his realization of *nirvāṇa*.

Let us consider first the languages in which these accounts are written. We are told that some of the schools have their sacred texts in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhraṃśa, or Paiśāci. And it is well known that we have texts in Pali. There is also a tradition to the effect that the texts were written in different countries in different languages, so much so that not less than ninety-six languages or dialects were employed in ninety-six countries.[83] This tradition may have some kernel of truth. Scholars dispute as to whether the existing texts found in different languages are in fact the originals or whether they are translations of some common texts in a certain language which remains unknown.

[83] evam koṭikoṭigrāmātmakeṣu ṣaṇṇavativiṣayeṣu ṣaṇṇavatibhāṣayā likhitam.—*Vimalaprabhā*, a commentary on the *Laghukālacakratantrarāja* described by Haraprasad Shastri in his *Descriptive Catalogue of Skt. MSS. in the Government Collection*, Vol. I, p. 77.

Consider again the fact that the available texts in various languages have no complete agreement there being in them many omissions and additions. The same is the case also with the translations of the texts in Tibetan, Chinese, Mongolian, etc. Consider also the fact that happened just after the death of the Teacher about his teaching. When the Bhikkhus were weeping and lamenting over the death of the Master, one Subhadda, a late entrant into the Order, said to other Bhikkhus: "Enough, Sirs, weep not, neither lament! We are well rid of the Great Samaṇa. We used to be annoyed by being told 'This beseems you, this beseems you not.' But now we shall be able to do whatever we like; and what we do not like, that we shall not have to do." [34] This was an index to the mind of a section of the people, and it led to the holding of the different Buddhist councils. How the disciples of the Master, direct or indirect, differed in interpreting his teaching is evident among others from the facts of the councils and the formation of a number of schools, every one of which claimed to be the true expounder. To this is to be added the evolution of a number of *mārgas* 'ways' called in the system *yāna* 'vehicle,' such as *Devayāna*, *Brahma°*, *Śrāvaka°*, *Pratyekabuddha°*, or *Hīna°*, *Mahā°*, *Mantra°*, *Vajra°*, etc.[35]

34 *Vinaya Piṭako*, XI. 1. 1.

35 LA, pp. 134-135; SP, pp. 46, 48. *Brahmayāna* seems to be the same as *Mahāyāna*.

The Master was one, and it is quite natural to think that his teaching in regard to the cessation of misery was also one. Why then this bewildering divergence?

As says Mādhavācārya in dealing with Buddhist philosophy in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*,[36] the words of the Master were taken by his disciples in different lights. It is true that he taught them the same thing, but owing to their varied dispositions they understood it differently. It is a common experience that the same word conveys different meanings to different persons. For example, we quote Mādhavācārya again, the sentence 'the sun is set' may imply to a thief that it is time for committing theft; to a Brāhman, that it is time for saying his evening prayers; and to an amorous man, that it is time for meeting his sweetheart. But what was meant by the speaker himself? That is a problem, the answer whereof is not very easy to give. The problem is the same in the teachings of the Buddha.

Naturally in order to find out the truth we have no other course than to depend upon the patient and careful study of the works embodying the words of the Master as well as those dealing with his life and teachings, always remembering what has already been said about their condition. Strange to say, we find that even in the oldest

[36] Govt. Oriental Series, Poona, 1924, p. 19.

class of works the teachers themselves are confronted with the same problem. Many facts or statements they come across, which appeared to them to be in apparent conflict with one another and they tried their best to reconcile them arriving thereby at a synthesis. It is, however, to be noted that sometimes those statements, in the form they have been presented to us, are the words of the Master himself, or of the teachers or authors. But let not discrepancies in reported speech, however authoritative, detain us, for, what we want to get down to is the central import thereof.

But what do we find? The Blessed One as a Bodhisattva was born for the welfare of all. He wanted to lead every one to the final goal, and without doing so he could not take rest. He trained the people who differed according to the difference in their dispositions. In short, there were, as at present, three classes of his disciples, *viz.* inferior, middle, and superior. He taught them all the same thing, no doubt, but in order to make it intelligible to all, he did it in different words, and it may be, in different languages, too, just as a mother does not give the same food to all her sons of different ages. Yet, in both the cases stated above the thing which is essential is given to all of them, and that thing is, in fact, the same, though the forms may differ. Exactly in the same way an expert physician does not give the same medicine to all his patients, but his medicine

differs in different cases. Yet he cures all of them. Actually the Buddha is often compared to a great physician (*vaidyarāja*).[37] And he himself is reported to have said that physicians resort to different kinds of treatments for different patients. Yet the medical science (*śāstra*) is not self-contradictory, the difference of treatment is due to the difference in diseases. So the teachings of the Buddha do not differ, they remain always one and the same, but their application is different owing to the varied dispositions of the people.[38] So a particular medicine is not meant for all, nor are all medicines for one. And even as what is medicine for one is not necessarily medicine for another, so a teaching of the Buddha meant for one is no teaching for another.[39] Yet the

37 *Lalitavistara*, Bib. Ind., pp. 448, 458.

38 LA, p. 204:

vaidyā yathāturavaśāt kriyābhedaṃ prakurvate ।
na tu śāstrasya bhedo 'sti doṣabhedāt tu bhidyate ॥ 115
tathāhaṃ sattvasantānaṃ kleśadoṣair vidūṣitam ।
indriyāṇāṃ balaṃ jñātvā nayaṃ deśemi prāṇināṃ ॥ 116
na kleśendriyabhedena śāsanam bhidyate mama ।
ekam eva bhaved yānaṃ mārgam aṣṭāṅgikaṃ śivam ॥ 117

39 LA, pp. 48-49:

deśanāpi yathā citrā deśyate vyabhicāriṇī ।
deśanā hi yad anyasya tad anyasyāpy adeśanā । 122
āture āture yadvad bhiṣag dravyaṃ prayacchati ॥ 123

SS, p. 20 (97):

ātury āturi bhaiṣajyaṃ yadvad bhiṣak prayacchati ।
cittamātraṃ tathā buddhāḥ sattvānāṃ deśayanti vai ॥

truth imparted through all the teachings is the same.[40]

The principle underlying this distinction is called 'skilfulness in method' (*upāyakauśalya*) of the Buddha, by which all discrepancies in his teachings can be explained. And so, though there are different *yānas* as mentioned above, there is, in fact, not more than one *yāna*. He himself is reported to have said that it was his skilfulness in method that he manifested the three *yānas* (referring to *Śrāvaka-*, *Pratyekabuddha-*, and *Buddha-yānas*); but there was only one *yāna*, one method, and one instruction of the Leaders (*i.e.* the Buddhas). All the highest men (*puruṣottama*) revealed a number of pure laws by means of illustrations, reasons, and arguments with their varied skilfulness of method. All of them, however, manifested but one *yāna* (referring to the *Buddha-* or *Mahā-yāna*) and introduced but one *yāna* on the earth.[41] We are also told by the Buddha himself that he

[40] *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, 97-98 (Tib.), quoted in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, p. 45:

> deśanā lokanāthānāṃ sattvāśayavaśānugāḥ |
> bhidyate bahudhā loka upāyair bahubhiḥ punaḥ ||

[41] SP, II:

> upāyakauśalya mamevarupaṃ
> yat trīṇi yānany upadarśayāmi |
> ekaṃ tu yānaṃ hi nayaś ca eka
> ekā ciyaṃ deśana nāyakānaṃ || 69

has 'spoken of the Devayāna, Brahmayāna, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekayāna, and Tathāgatayāna (=Buddha- or Mahā-yāna). There is no end of *yānas* so long as the consciousness or mind (*citta*) remains in motion (*pravartate*), but when it turns back there is neither a *yāna*, nor one who goes thereby. I say difference of *yānas*, but this is only for the purpose of attracting the ignorant people.' [42]

The above statements are made, as is clear enough, from the Yogācāra point of view. From the standpoint of the Mādhyamikas, Nāgārjuna says in his *Niraupamyastava*,[43] that as there is no difference whatever with regard to the highest truth (*dharmadhātu*=*paramārtha*) there is, in reality, no difference of *yānas*. Yet, the Master has

sarvehi tehi purusottamehi
prakāśitā dharma bahū viśuddhāḥ |
dṛṣṭāntakaiḥ kāraṇahetubhiś ca
upāyakauśalyaśatair anekaiḥ || 72
sarve ca te deśayi ekayānam
ekam ca yānam avatārayanti || 73

42 LA, pp. 135 ff.:

devayānaṃ brahmayānaṃ śrāvakīyaṃ tathaiva ca |
tāthāgataṃ ca pratyekaṃ yānān etān vadāmy ahaṃ || 203
yānānāṃ nāsti vai niṣṭhā yāvac cittaṃ pravartate |
citte tu vai parāvṛtte na yānaṃ na tu yāyinaḥ || 204
yānavyavasthā naivāsti yānabhedaṃ vadāmy ahaṃ |
parikarṣaṇārthaṃ bālānāṃ yānabhedaṃ vadāmy ahaṃ || 205

43 Ed. Tucci, JRAS, 1932; Prabhubhai Patel, IHQ, 1932, Vol. VIII, p. 319 (21).

spoken of three *yānas* (Śrāvaka-, Pratyekabuddha-, and Buddha-yāna), but that only for leading the people to the goal (*sattāvatāra*).[44]

Attempts have been made to reconcile the difference of *yānas* also in other ways. We are told that though the highest truth (*paramārtha*) is to be obtained from the Mahāyāna, and as such only this is to be resorted to, yet the Master taught also the other two *yānas*, Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, for they like a staircase lead one to the Mahāyāna, and as such are meant for beginners.[45]

In Buddhism or in Buddhist philosophy there are, as is well known, different views, such as *vijñānavāda* and *śūnyavāda*. I am not entering into details, but I am only raising a question: How could the Teacher himself have propounded these two opposite theories? How can he be held as the author of both of them? There are texts accepted as the words of the Teacher himself purporting to say that all these three worlds are

44 dharmadhātor asambhedād yānabhedo'sti na prabho |
yānatritayam ākhyātaṃ tvayā sattvāvatārataḥ ||
—Quoted in SS, p. 14 (20), Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvali* in AS, p. 22.

45 Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvali*, p. 21: nanu yadi mahāyānanirṇīta evārthaḥ paramārtho'sti asya (? atha ?) kimarthaṃ tarhi śrāvakapratyekayāne bhagavān deśitavān. tan na. mahāyānaprāpyaprāpaṇārtham eva śrāvakapratyekayānanirmāṇāt. tad uktam:

ādikarmikasattvasya paramārthāvatāraṇe |
upāyas tv ayaṃ sambuddhaiḥ sopānam iva nirmitaḥ ||

nothing but *citta* 'pure consciousness;'[46] and there are again similar texts informing us that all is *śūnya* 'void.'[47] Which of these two statements is true? It cannot be said that none of them is true, for both of them are held to be the speech of the Buddha (*buddha-vacana*). If one of them is authoritative, the other is also authoritative. If you reject one, you will have to reject also the other. So a reconciliation must be found out. We are told, evidently by the Mādhyamikas, that it cannot be denied that according to the Sage the world is nothing but *citta*, but in reality he does not mean it, that teaching being meant only to remove the terror of the ordinary or ignorant people (*bāla*) who are generally frightened to hear of the profound doctrine of 'voidness' (*śūnyatā*), being not able to understand it thoroughly.[48] It is further said: The teaching of the Master that the world of our every day experience exists is meant only for those foolish and child-like persons who are strongly attached to the existence of the world and are frightened even to hear of the profound and subtle truth. But those who have a

[46] cittamātraṃ bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam.—*Daśabhūmiśvarasūtra*, ed. Rhader, p. 49: SS, fol. 25; *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Tib.), VI. 83; TSP, 550; VM, p. 13.

[47] śūnyā eva dharmāḥ.—KP, p. 94.

[48] MV, p 276; SS, p. 20 (98):

cittamātraṃ jagat sarvam iti yā deśanā muneḥ ।
uttrāsaparihārārthaṃ bālānāṃ sā na tattvataḥ ॥

better intellect, but are yet ill-witted, are taught that all this is only pure consciousness (*vijñāna*), there being neither the perceiver nor the perceptible. And those whose minds are freed from all sorts of impurities by profound meditation for years are advised that all this is just like an imaginary town in the sky (*gandharvanagara*).[49]

How this reconciliation of different views found in the canonical and most authoritative works on Buddhism has been carried further will be clearly seen if we quote here only a couplet from the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna (XVIII. 6):

'The Buddhas have made known that there is the Self (*ātman*); they have taught that there is not-Self (*anātman*); they have also taught that there is neither the Self nor the not-Self.'[50]

[49] asti khalv iti nīlādi jagad iti jaḍīyase ।
bhāvagrāhagrahāveśagambhīranayabhīrave ॥ 71
vijñānamātram evedaṃ citraṃ jagad udāhṛtam ।
grāhyagrāhakabhedena rahitaṃ mandamedhase ॥ 72
gandharvanagarākāraṃ satyadvitayalāñchanam ।
ameyānantakalpaughabhāvanāśuddhamedhase ॥ 73
—SS, p. 14.

See also with regard to the first of these three classes of people the following stanza in SS, p. 19:

evaṃ hi gambhīranayān padārthān
na vetti yas tam prati deśaneyam ।
asty ālayaḥ pudgala eva ceti
skandhā ime vā khalu dhātavaś ca ॥

[50] ātmety api prajñapitam anātmety api deśitam ।
buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaścid ity api deśitam ॥

But how can it be? How can the Buddha teach these opposite things? The answer is, as has already been said, that all these teachings are not meant for one and the same class of people, but for different classes of them, *viz.* inferior, middle and superior respectively.

The great difficulty in understanding the true significance of the *Buddha-vacana*, 'the speech of the Buddha,' is clearly shown in very authoritative canonical works, such as the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, in which the Buddha himself is reported to have taught his disciples as to how the actual meaning of a text is to be ascertained. In teaching the Buddha follows two *nayas* 'principles' or 'methods,' *viz. siddhāntanaya* and *deśanānaya*; the first means the method by which the conlcusion can be shown, while the other is the method adopted for discoursing. The former is meant for the wise (*yogins*), and the latter for the ignorants (*bālas*).[51]

By the former one penetrates the truth, while by the latter one is acquainted with general instructions on conduct gradually leading to the final goal.

Besides what has been said above, is to be considered the following in regard to the nature of the scripture on which we are required to rely for

[51] nayo hi dvividhaṃ mahyaṃ siddhānto deśanā ca vai |
deśemi yaṃ ca bālānāṃ siddhāntaṃ yogināṃ ahaṃ ||
LA, p. 172 (61). See also pp. 148, 171.

our conclusion. It is clear in the canonical works themselves that the sūtras or passages or discourses thereof are not of the same value as regards their significance; for, while some of them give us explicit meanings the others do not do so, presenting senses which are not determined or are 'intentional.' These two kinds of *sūtras* are called *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*, respectively. The word *nītārtha* literally means 'the meaning of which is determined or explicit (*vibhaktārtha*);' while *neyārtha* means 'the meaning of which is not determined (*aniścita*), but is to be determined, and as such causes various doubts.'[52]

Confronted with the difficulty of arriving at the true sense the authors of the canonical works themselves were constrained to determine some characteristics, by which these *nītārtha* and *neyārtha* sūtras could be distinguished. And so it is said in the *Ārya-Akṣayamati-sūtra*[53] that those sūtras which are delivered for leading one to the way to salvation (*mārgāvatāra*) are *neyārtha*; while those which are for leading one to the final result (*phalāvatāra*) are *nītārtha*. And the people are urged to follow the *nītārtha* sūtras and not *neyārtha* ones.[54]

[52] See MV, pp. 43, 597-8; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I, xvii; AK, IX, pp. 246-7

[53] Quoted in MV, p. 43.

[54] MV, p. 43; MVt, § 73: nītārthasūtrapratisaraṇena bhavitavyaṃ na neyārthasūtrapratisaraṇena.

But naturally there was confusion and doubt as to the distinction between these two kinds of discourses. And if we ask Candrakīrtti, he would tell us in his *Madhyamakavṛtti* (p. 42) that it is for the sake of those who fall into doubt as to whether a particular discourse refers to the absolute truth or whether it conveys some intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) meaning, and also for the sake of those who, owing to their slow wit, mistake a *neyārtha* discourse for *nītārtha*, that this work (*i.e.* Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*) was composed by the Teacher.

In fact, the same view is expressed by the Buddhas themselves, as say the scriptures in a different way. It is said that in their teachings there is *sandhābhāṣya*[55] 'intentional speech.' And this is very difficult to understand (*durbodhya*), for in elucidating the law the Tathāgata uses various kinds of skilful means, such as different interpretations, indications, explanations, and illustrations.[56]

[55] *Sandhābhāṣita*, *sandhābhāṣā*, and *sandhāvacana* are synonyms. See SP, pp. 34, 39, 60, 70. For the meaning see IHQ, IV, 1828, p. 287 ff.

[56] SP, II. 144:

etādṛṣī deśana nāyakānām
upāyakauśalyam idaṃ variṣṭham |
bahūni sandhāvacanehi coktaṃ
durbodhyam etaṃ hi aśikṣitehi ||

See also note 55.

This *sandhābhāṣya* or *sandhāvacana* has played a great part in the later development of Buddhism, such as the Vajrayāna and Sahajayāna. It has been the cause of various doubts with regard to the true significance of texts. And it has given rise to two-fold explanation, exoteric and esoteric in Buddhism. This can be traced back even to the *Laṅkāvatāra*. The five *ānantaryas* ‘ immediate or uninterrupted sins,’ commonly translated as five ‘ deadly sins ’ are well known in Buddhism. They are matricide, parricide, arhantcide, shedding the blood of a Buddha, and causing schism in the Order. This meaning is undisputed. But it is found in the *Laṅkāvatāra* (pp. 138-140) that this meaning is exoteric (*bāhya*) ; and there is another meaning which is esoteric (*ādhyātmika*). According to it (p. 140) the mother is *tṛṣṇā* ‘ desire,’ ‘ lust ;’ the father is *avidyā* ‘ ignorance,’ the Buddha is *vijñāna* ‘ consciousness,’ the Arhat is the *anuśayas* ‘ passions,’ and the Order is the *skandhas*. So by the actions of matricide, etc., referred to above one acquires merit and not demerit.

Let me here refer to two *gāthās* in the *Dhammapada* (294, 295) which run in translation as follows :

‘ A true Brāhmaṇa goes painless though he may have killed father and mother and two valiant kings, and destroyed a kingdom with all its subjects,’

' A true Brāhmaṇa goes painless, though he may have killed father and mother, and two Brāhmaṇa kings and a tiger as the fifth besides.'[57]

What does this mean? In the same way as shown above mother means desire (*tṛṣṇā*), father egoism (*asmimāna*), two kings the two wrong views of eternalism and nihilism (*śāśvata-* and *uccheda-dṛṣṭi*), the kingdom with all its subjects the six organs of senses and their six corresponding objects (*dvādaśa āyatanas*), together with enjoyments (*nandirāga*) ; two Brāhmaṇa kings are the two wrong views as above, and the tiger is the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*), *viz.* sensuality, ill-will, sloth and torpor, worry, and wavering.[58]

These identifications are due to some common qualities (*sāmānya dharma*), either real or imaginary, of things which are identified. For instance, *tṛṣṇā* ' craving ' is identified with mother, because as mother gives birth to a child so does craving to miseries. For details one should be referred to the original works with the commentary where available.

The use of *sandhāvacana* or intentional speech is found also in Upaniṣadic texts, as the following

[57] mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā rājāno dve ca khattiye—
raṭṭhaṃ sānucaraṃ hantvā anīgho yāti brāhmaṇo ||
mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā rājāno dve ca sottiye |
veyyaggha-pañcamaṃ hantvā anīgho yāti
brāhmaṇo ||

[58] See Max Müller's observations, SBE, Vol. X, pp. 71 ff.

passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (VI. 2.2) will show :

‘ I have heard of two paths for men, one leading to the fathers, the other leading to the gods. By these two (paths) all that lives moves on, whatever there is between father and mother.’ [59]

We are concerned here only with the last line of the stanza quoted above. What are we to understand here by the words father and mother ? They are used here not to imply father and mother in their ordinary senses, but to denote the sky and the earth (*dyāvāpṛthivī*),[60] which are conceived as the father and the mother respectively by the old sages considering some common qualities existing between the two sets. This identification is *bhaktivāda*, as Yāska would express it, meaning *guṇavāda* ‘statement meant figuratively.’

This *sandhāvacana* seems to have been indicated by the following phrase used frequently in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads : ‘ The gods love what is invisible (*parokṣa*) and dislike what is visible (*pratyakṣa*).[61] And it can be traced still

[59] dve sṛtī aśṛṇavaṃ pitṛṇām
aham devānām uta martyānām ।
tābhyām idaṃ viśvam ejat sameti
yad antarā pitaraṃ mātarañ ca ॥

[60] *Cf*. in the same sense the phrase *yad antarā dyāvāprithivī* in the same Upanishad, III. 8. 3-7.

[61] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, VI. i. 1-2, etc.; Br. Up., VI. 2.2 etc. : parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ pratyakṣadviṣaḥ.

further back to the Riddle-poems in the Saṃhitās or Vedic texts.

Let me quote here one of them in English from the Rigveda (IV. 58.3) : "Four are his horns (*śṛṅga*), three are his feet (*pāda*), his heads (*śiras*) are two, and his hands (*hasta*) are seven. Bound with triple bond, the strong one (or the showerer of bounties) roars loudly, the great god entered into the mortals." [62]

Who is that great god ? Commentators differ; some say, he is sacrifice (*yajña*) ; others say, the sun; while some others are of opinion that speech (*śabda*) is meant here. But who can tell what was meant by the sage himself to whom the mantra was revealed ?

Be that as it may, there is not an iota of doubt that the employment of the *sandhāvacana* which is capable of being easily misunderstood by an untrained mind is one of the main causes that brought about a most lamentable degeneration in Buddhism in its later forms, such as the Vajrayāna and the Sahajayāna. And if you care to know what this process finally led to I may refer you to a Buddhist Tantric work named *Ekallavīracaṇḍamahāroṣaṇatantra*, not yet published, but described by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya

[62] catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā
dve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya ।
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti
maho devo martyāṁ ā viveśa ॥

Pandit Haraprasad Shastri.[63] There are strong grounds for believing that if the *sandhāvacana* were explained thoroughly the original form of the Vajrayāna would not appear to be so revolting, so obscene, and so immoral, as it is generally regarded to be. This is a point regarding which I fully concur with Dr. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi.[64]

I have placed before you the various difficulties one is to surmount in order to grasp the true teaching of the Buddha. I should also like to mention another difficulty. Consider the extent of the modern Buddhist literature that is growing daily in and outside India. It shows considerable divergency of views on various points, thus making the problem more and more complex.

As we have already seen in some manner even the ancient teachers themselves were confronted with the same problem, *viz.* What did the Buddha say? Various answers were given with strong reasons reconciling the texts which on a number of points appear to differ very widely among themselves. But the questions are: Can we accept all the answers as true answers? Are they all approved by the Buddha?

63 *A Descriptive Catalogue of Skt. MSS. in the Govt. Collection* under the care of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1917, Vol. I, Buddhist MSS., pp. 131 ff. See p. 133 specially.

64 See IHQ, 1930, Vol. VI, pp. 389, 576.

It may be so, for like a good physician he instructed persons differently according to their particular needs. Or it may not be so, for we are told that he spoke of only one vehicle (*eka yāna*).[65] A synthesis may be made of all that we have before us about the Buddha and his teachings as presented by eminent teachers and scholars, ancient or modern. But all that can be said with certainty about such a synthesis is that it is the opinion more of the teachers or the scholars who make it than of the Buddha himself. For there is nothing to prove definitely that this and not that was actually meant by him.

I may give you here an example. Bādarāyaṇa is the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, and there is no doubt whatever that the doctrine that one derives from this work can be only one; it may be *dvaita* 'duality,' or *advaita* 'non-duality' or 'monism,' or *viśiṣṭādvaita* 'modified non-duality,' or *śuddhādvaita* 'pure non-duality,' or *dvaitādvaita* 'duality and non-duality,' or something else; but in no case can it be *all* of them at the same time. Reconciliation of all of them has been or may be tried, but whatever that may be we are not concerned with it; for we want to know what the author, Bādarāyaṇa, himself said.

65 ekaṃ tu yānaṃ hi nayaś ca eka
ekā ciyaṃ deśana nāyakānām ||
SP, II. 69. See also 70, 73; AAA, pp. 120-121.

In the same way we do not propose to learn or deal here with the doctrines of the different vehicles, such as the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, etc., or theories such as *vijñānavāda*, *śūnyavāda*, etc.; but what we want to get at is the doctrine that the Buddha himself preached.

But how to proceed to ascertain it? Indeed, the way is one very difficult to tread upon. Yet we need not despair. There is a light to guide us, supplied by the Vedic sages to whom the same problem was presented with regard to the Vedic passages. They have said that the sense of the hymns is to be construed by the help of oral tradition as well as reasoning. But to a person who is not a Ṛṣi, or to one who has no profound meditation the meaning does not become manifest. And here is a short apologue :

'Verily when the Ṛṣis were passing away, men inquired of the gods, "Who shall be our Ṛṣi?" They gave them the science of reasoning as Ṛṣi (*tarkam ṛṣim*) for constructing the sense of the hymns. Therefore, what is decided by a man well-versed in the Veda becomes *ārṣa* or derived from a Ṛṣi.' [66]

We may recall in this connection the dialogue that took place between the Blessed One and Ānanda just before the former's passing away :

[66] *The Supplement to Nirukta* (*Nirukta-pariśiṣṭa*), XIII. 11.

'Now the Exalted One addressed the Venerable Ānanda and said : "It may be, Ānanda, that in some of you the thought may arise, 'The word of the Master is ended, we have no teacher more!' But it is not thus, Ānanda, that you should regard it. The truths and the Rules of the Order which I have set forth and laid down for you all, let them, after I am gone, be the teacher of you." [67]

These two statements, one Brahmanic and the other Buddhistic, are our guides, and with them let us proceed in search of what is the basic conception of Buddhism, a problem I propose to deal with in my next lecture.

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[67] *Mahāparinirbbānasutta*, VI. 1.

LECTURE II

The Main Problem

In the first lecture I have shown, *inter alia,* that there is a great difficulty in understanding the true teaching of the Buddha, for the canonical works which are regarded as embodying that teaching as well as many other texts based upon them, both ancient and modern, are conflicting in many respects, and often on a number of points which are vital. This, however, is not peculiar to Buddhism, but also to other religions, and the older a religion, the greater are the diversities in its explanation. Yet, the human mind must find its satisfaction by trying its best to understand what truth is. Let us therefore make an attempt to proceed with all caution in that direction.

Before proceeding I would, however, ask you to pause here for a while to recall what was said in brief in my first lecture about the religious and philosophical atmosphere of the country in the age when the Buddha appeared. It is the past that makes the present. The sprout depends for its being on the seed which is, in fact, its previous state. In the same way the Buddha was made what he was by all that preceded him.

It is quite clear that the way followed by him was made considerably easy for him by his

predecessors. For instance, you may remember that we started from Vedic ritualism and saw how faith in it gradually waned and finally vanished away among such thinkers, as the Vedāntists, Sāṅkhyas, and others. We have also seen that the Vedic sacrifices, subsequently called *dravya-yajñas* 'sacrifices with material things' had already begun to be interpreted esoterically, their outward forms being altogether discarded. And thus their place was taken up by what is called *jñāna-yajña* 'the sacrifice by knowledge,' which, as the *Bhagavadgītā* would say, is far superior to *dravya-yajña*. The Buddha subscribed to this view and rejected *dravya-yajña* in unmistakable terms.

He did not, however, reject the performance of karma, but on the contrary, advocated it strongly. Like some of his predecessors [1] he was a staunch believer in it and used to say that men are the inheritors of karma (*kammadāyāda*), karma is their very own (*kammassaka*), karma is the cause of their rebirth (*kammayoni*), and karma is their refuge (*kammapaṭisaraṇa*).[2]

It is, however, to be noted that while the ritualists understood by karma mainly different

[1] For instance, the Vedāntins say in the Īśā Up., 2: kurvann eva hi karmāṇi jijīviṣec chataṃ samāḥ.—'One should wish to live a hundred years only performing karmas.' The *Bhagavadgītā* will lend here strong support.

[2] MN, III, p. 203; MP, p. 65.

Vedic rites and sacrifices, the Buddha along with the Vedāntists and others took it in its ordinary sense, 'action'—action of body, mind, and speech. But with regard to spiritual advancement karma meant to him only mental action (*mānasaṃ karma*). This view also is not his own, as it is evidently found among some of his predecessors. However, according to him karma is, in fact, nothing but *cetanā* (or *citta*)[3] 'volition,' or 'mental action' (*mānasaṃ karma*), as Vasubandhu (AK, IV, 1) would express it. 'It is volition, O monks, that I call karma,'—declared the Buddha.[4] And it is emphatically said that there is no karma excepting thought.[5]

Therefore, even such actions as *dānapāramitā* 'perfection of giving,' etc. are, in reality, not external, but internal, and as such are only some particular *cittas*. So we are told 'If it is held that *dānapāramitā* is fulfilled by removing the poverty of the world, then how can it be said that

[3] Here *cetanā* and *citta* are synonymous. See MV, XVII. 1-2.

[4] AN, III, p. 415: cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kamman ti vadāmi. cetayitvā kammoṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā vā. See MK, XVII. 1-2 with MV; BAP, p. 472; AK, IV. 1.

[5] satvalokam atha bhājanolokaṃ
cittam eva racayaty aticitram |
karmajaṃ hi jagad uktam aśeṣaṃ
karma cittam avadhūya ca nāsti ||

It is quoted in BAP, pp. 99, 472 ; Pañcakramaṭ. p. 40.

the former Buddhas performed it? For, the world is still poor. Therefore, when there arises the *citta* of giving up to all everything that is in one's possession, together with the reward thereof then that is called *dānapāramitā*. Therefore it is only a *citta*.'[6]

The whole teaching of *karmayoga* in the *Bhagavadgītā* centres round this interpretation of karma and it declares (IV. 29) that when the mind is free from all attachment one commits no sin simply by a physical action.[7]

In the same way like one or other of his predecessors already referred to in the first lecture, the Buddha rejected the authority of any scripture and depended solely on pure reason; he did not assign any place to God in his system, nor had he any faith in the existence of the soul in its accepted sense; he felt the impermanence of the world and consequently its unworthiness as an object of enjoyment; he renounced the world remaining in that state till he lived after his enlightenment; he practised yoga and austerities, though their rigour was much lessened afterwards; he accepted that it is ignorance (*avidyā*) that

6 BA, V, 9-10:

adaridraṃ jagat kṛtvā dānapāramitā yadi |
jagad daridram adyāpi sā kathaṃ pūrvatāyinām ||
phalena saha sarvasvatyāgacittāj jane 'khile |
dānapāramitā proktā tasmāt sā cittam eva tu ||

7 śārīraṃ kevalaṃ karma kurvannāpnoti kilbiṣam |

causes bondage, and necessarily knowledge leads to liberation; he believed also with some of his predecessors that until desire or thirst or craving (*kāma, tṛṣṇā*) is rooted out there is no hope of peace. With the last two points which are of vital importance I desire to deal more particularly as we proceed.

But the question is: What is it on which he laid the foundation of his religion? What is it round which centered all his thoughts and teachings? Let me make here an attempt to find out the answer, if I can, according to my light.

Let me invite your attention, first of all, to a stanza in the Rigveda (X. 129. 4). It runs in translation as follows:

'In the beginning there was *Kāma* 'desire,' the earliest seed of mind, and the sages in their hearts with wisdom found out the bond of being in non-being.'[8]

And if you consult Sāyaṇa who has commented upon it[9] he would tell you on an ancient authority that 'it is desire that binds the world, there is

8 kāmas tad agre samavartatāgre
manaso retaḥ prathamaṃ yad āsīt ।
sato bandhum asati niravindan
hṛdi pratīṣyā kavayo manīṣā ॥

9 *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, II. 8.9.5.

no other bond.'[10] About this we have the following in the Atharvaveda (III. 29.7):

'Who hath given this to whom?
Kāma hath given to Kāma;
Kāma is giver, Kāma recipient,
Kāma entered into the Ocean.'

What does the last line of this stanza mean? Says a Vedic text itself: 'Kāma is just like an ocean, as it has no end.'[11] The same idea is expressed in other words in another Vedic work, *i. e.* the Atharvaveda, IX. 2. 23:

'Superior to the ocean art thou, O Kāma, fury.'[12]

And it is further said in the same Atharvaveda, IX. 2. 19-20, in which an entire hymn is found on Kāma:

'Kāma was first born; not the gods, the fathers, nor mortals attained it. To them art thou superior and always great. To thee as such, O Kāma, do I pay homage.'

'How great in width are heaven and earth, how far the waters flow, how far fire — to them art thou superior, always great; to thee as such, O Kāma, do I pay homage.'[13]

10 Vyāso'pi smarati:

kāmabandhanam evedaṃ
nānyad astīha bandhanam ।

11 *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, II. 2 5. 6: samudra iva hi kāmaḥ na hi kāmasyānto 'sti.

12 jyāyān samudrād asi kāma manyo.

13 Translation by Whitney.

In a number of Vedic passages [14] this kāma is identified with *Agni* 'fire.' And what this identification is due to is not far to seek. Agni is never satisfied with any amount of fuel, just so kāma can in no way be satisfied with any amount of its objects. No better statement of it can be made than what Manu (II. 94) has done, and, I am sure, it is well-known to all of you :

'Kāma is never extinguished by the enjoyment of desired objects; it only grows stronger as does fire with clarified butter.' [15]

That the pursuit of kāma leads one astray entangling in unthinkable miseries and sufferings is an idea that has gained ground more and more in our country from the Vedic times downwards. And so the sage declared :

'When the kāmas that are in his heart cease, then at once the mortal becomes immortal and obtains here (in this life) Brahman.'

'When all the ties [16] of the heart are severed here then at once the mortal becomes immortal.' [17]

And he concluded saying that 'here ends the teaching (*etāvad anuśāsanam*).'

[14] AV, III. 21. 4 : yo devo (=Agni) viśvād yam u kāmam āhuḥ; VI. 36.3. See Muir's *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. V, p. 403.

[15] na jātu kāmaḥ kāmānām upabhogena śāmyati |
havisā kṛṣṇavartmeva bhūya evābhivardhate ||

[16] *i.e.*, passions.

[17] Kaṭha Up., VI. 14-15.

In this connection I would ask you to refer to the celebrated dialogue between Death and Naciketas in the same work. Let me quote here only a few lines from it.[18]

Death said to Naciketas: 'Choose sons and grandsons who shall live a hundred years, herds of cattle, elephants, gold, and horses. Choose the wide abode of the earth, and live thyself as many harvests as thou desirest. If you can think of any boon equal to that, choose wealth and long life. Be (king), Naciketas, on the wide earth. I make thee the enjoyer of all desires (*kāmānāṃ tvā kāmabhājaṃ karomi*). Whatever desires are difficult to attain among mortals, ask for them according to thy wish:—these fair maidens with their chariots and musical instruments,—such are indeed not to be obtained by men,—be waited on by them whom I give to thee, but do not ask me about dying.'

And here is the reply of Naciketas:

'These things last till to-morrow, O Death, for they wear out the vigour of all the senses. Even the whole of life is short. Keep then thy horses, keep dance and songs for thyself. No man can be happy by wealth.'[19]

Now let us turn to the life of the Buddha. There is irreconcilable diversity of opinion with

18 *Op. cit.*, I. 23-26.

19 Translation by MaxMüller.

regard to what he actually taught. But there is entire agreement on the point that he had to fight very bravely with all his power against his terrible enemy, Māra, the evil one, whom he completely defeated at the end. And it is only after this that he became *Buddha*. This conquering of Māra described so elaborately and in ornate language by writers or so nicely depicted by painters has rightly occupied a permanent place in the stories of his life. Indeed, one may ignore, if one so desires, all the other events in the life of the Buddha, but one can in no way overlook the fact of his having conquered Māra.

But who is that Māra? Nothing but the personified kāma. The word *Māra* which is derived from the root $\sqrt{}$*mṛ* 'to die' actually means 'death' and, in fact, there is no difference whatever in meaning between it and *mṛtyu* which is also a derivative of the same root. And if the tremendous evil that kāma causes to a man is taken into consideration there will be no two opinions on the matter that there is no word better than *māra* that can properly be applied to mean kāma.

Leaving aside all the other utterances that the Blessed One made about the evil consequences of Māra or kāma, the root cause of all sorts of suffering, I would ask you to pay attention to the passage quoted below which, according to a tradition, is said to have been his first speech after

his enlightenment :

'Through birth and rebirth's endless round,
Seeking in vain, I hastened on,
To find who framed this edifice.
What misery !—birth incessantly !

O builder ! I've discovered thee !
This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild !
Thy rafters all are broken now,
And pointed roof demolished lies !
This mind has demolition reached,
And seen the last of all desire !'[20]

The religious systems and literature of the country is full of this idea of kāma and its extinction, though they differ sometimes very widely in the matter of details. You know how it is described throughout the text of the *Bhagavadgītā*. As the root of evils it is called there the 'great consuming' (*mahāśana*) and the 'great evil' (*mahāpāpman*), and is regarded as a 'great and constant enemy' (*mahāśatru* and *nityavairin*). And with regard to its cessation we are told there thus :

'Only he attains peace within whom all desires merge as rivers merge in the ocean, which is ever

[20] *Dhammapada*, 153-154 :

anekajātisaṃsāraṃ sandhāvissaṃ anibbisaṃ |
gahakāraṃ gavesanto dukkhā jāti punappunaṃ ||
gahakāraka diṭṭho si puna geham na kāhasi |
sabbā te phāsukā bhaggā gahakūṭaṃ visaṅkhataṃ |
visaṅkhāragataṃ cittaṃ taṇhānaṃ khayam ajjhagā ||

Eng. Tran. from Warren's *Buddhism in Translation*, 1922, p. 83.

full and ever unmoved; but it can never be attained by him who cherishes desires.'

'One who having abandoned all desires goes onwards without attachment and being free from the idea that 'it is I' and 'this is mine,' attains peace.'[21]

The two great epics of the country, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, clearly show the evil consequence of kāma from beginning to end. Kālidāsa has touchingly depicted in his *Kumārasambhava* that until Madana 'Cupid' or Kāma was reduced to ashes Pārvatī could not realize the joy of her union with Śiva, the embodiment of eternal bliss and peace. The first union of Śakuntalā with the king, in the *Abhijñānaśakuntala*, was not a happy one when both of them were attracted to each other owing to the strong impulses of kāma. But the real union of them took place in the last act of the drama when the heart of each of them was free from passion and full of pure love. Instances need not be multiplied.

Now, there is another thing to which the Buddha directed his attention, following here too

[21] āpūryamāṇam acalapratiṣṭhaṃ
samudram āpaḥ praviśanti yadvad |
tadvat kāmā yaṃ praviśanti sarve
sa śāntim āpnoti na kāmakāmī ||

vihāya kāmān yaḥ sarvān pumāṃś carati niṣpṛhaḥ |
nirmamo nirahaṅkāraḥ sa śāntim adhigacchati ||

II. 70-71.

the footsteps of his predecessors. Undoubtedly, desire is the cause of sorrow. But its other causes, such as hatred and self-centredness, are also often mentioned. These are, however, associates, so to say, of desire, from which they arise. But *avidyā* 'ignorance' is held also to be a cause of sorrow. As desire comes from ignorance it is the root cause of sorrow. The Blessed One is reported to have said once :

'Just as in a peaked house (*kūṭāgāra*), O Brethren, whatever rafters there are, all converge to the roof-peak, resort equally to the roof-peak, all go to junction there, even so, whatever wrong states there are all have their root in ignorance, all may be referred to ignorance, all are fixed together in ignorance, all go to junction there.'[22]

And again :

'Whatever misfortunes there are here in this world, or in the next, they all have their root in ignorance (*avijjāmūlaka*), and are given rise to by longing and desire.'[23]

Avidyā means non-perception or wrong perception of truth.[24] The man who does not perceive or wrongly perceives the truth imagines things which are in reality not in existence ; and by

22 SN, XX. 1. Trans. by Mrs. Rhys Davids.

23 *Itivuttaka* (§ 40), p. 34.

24 tattve 'pratipattir mithyāpratipattir ajñānam avidyā. *Śālistambasūtra* quoted in SS, p. 222 ; BAP, p. 352 ; MV, p. 564.

doing so he thinks evil to be good. And naturally there arises desire, and once it comes forth it leads him astray bringing about his ruin ; as says the *Bhagavadgītā* (II. 62-63) :

'Man musing on the objects of the senses conceives an attachment to them ; from attachment arises desire ; from desire anger, from anger delusion, from delusion the confusion of memory, from confusion of memory the destruction of reason (*buddhi*), and from the destruction of reason he comes to ruin.'

Now the cessation of desire follows that of ignorance. And ignorance disappears only when there is knowledge (*vidyā*) or perfect wisdom or 'perfection of wisdom' (*prajñāpāramitā*), as the Buddhists would express it.

On this point, up to this, there is complete agreement between the Blessed One and most of his predecessors. But after this they differed widely from each other holding diametrically opposite views with regard to the Truth, the object of their knowledge or wisdom.

According to the sages of the Upaniṣads the truth is Ātman, and, as we have already seen in the first lecture, when this Ātman is perfectly perceived or realized there remains absolutely nothing that can be desired, all desires being completely satisfied. We are told in an Upaniṣad (Ch. Up., VII. 25. 1-3) :

'The Infinite (*bhūman*) indeed is below, above, behind, before, right and left—it is indeed all this.'

'Now follows the declaration of the Infinite as I: I am below, I am above, I am behind, before, right and left—I am all this.'

'Next follows the declaration of the Infinite as the Self (*Ātman*): Self is below, Self is above, Self is behind, before, left and right—Self is all this.'

'He who sees, perceives, and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self—he becomes a *svarāj* (self-resplendent); he is lord and master in all the worlds.'

Again it is declared by a sage (Br. Up., IV. 4. 12): 'If a man understands himself (*ātman*) saying "This I am" (*ayam asmi*), what could he wish or desire for the sake of which he should pursue the body?'

In fact, according to these seers there is only the Self without a second. And that being so, there is nothing that could be an object of desire. Nor is there anything to be frightened of. It is a fact that when there are two there is a possibility of fear. When there are both, a tiger and a man, the latter has the cause to be frightened. Here is a very short, yet very interesting story from an Upaniṣad (Br. Up, I. 4.1.2):

In the beginning there was only Self. He looked round and saw nothing except himself.

And he was afraid. And therefore every one, when alone, is afraid. But he thought to himself 'As there is nothing but myself why should I fear.' His fear passed away, for verily it is the second only from which fear arises (*dvitīyād vai bhayaṃ bhavati*).

Thus by realizing the Self one becomes completely free not only from desire but also from various kinds of anxiety, trouble, and sorrow.

Other teachers besides the Vedāntists, who believe in the theory of Ātman, are also of opinion, that it is through the extinction of desire that one can attain to salvation. For instance, the Yājñikas or Mīmāṃsists who are mainly concerned with Vedic rites and ceremonies warn their followers in unmistakable terms against the performance of *kāmya* karmas or ceremonies done from interested motives and advise the doing only of such karma as is indispensable or obligatory and occasional (*nitya* and *naimittika*).

The followers of the *bhakti-mārga* 'the path of devotion' having absolute faith in the Supreme Being have found a very easy way of getting rid of all desire. They keep nothing for themselves having dedicated all to their Lord.

From the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the best of the devotional works of the country, I should like to quote a few words of Prahlāda, the embodiment of perfect devotion. The Lord appeared before him and asked him to choose a boon which

He would fulfil for He always fulfils the desires of every one. And the following is Prahlāda's prayer by way of reply :

'Ever since I was born, I have been attached to the objects of desire ; don't tempt me again with those boons ! I am frightened of them and feel disgusted with them. I want liberation and have taken refuge in Thee. Certainly, O Lord, it is in order to test whether I am a true servant of Thine that Thou hast tempted me, Thy devotee, by inducing me to the objects of desire, which are simply a bondage for the soul and the seed of the *saṃsāra* ; otherwise, it would not have been possible for Thee whose heart is full of compassion. A servant who wants some desirable things from his master is not a true servant, yea, he is, in truth, a trader ; nor is he a true master who offers his servant the desirables in order to keep his dominion over him. I am Thine devotee with no desire whatsoever, and Thou art my Lord without any expectations. The objects of us both are not like those of a king and his servant. Yet, if, O Thou who art the greatest giver of gifts, shouldst grant me a boon, pray, grant me, O Lord, this, that no desire (*kāma*) might arise in my heart !' [17]

[17] mā māṃ pralobhayotpattyāsaktaṃ kāmeṣu tair varaiḥ |
tatsaṅgabhīto nirviṇṇo mumukṣus tvām upāgataḥ ||
bhṛtyalakṣaṇañjijñāsur bhaktaṃ kāmeṣv acodayat |
bhavān saṃsārabījeṣu hṛdayagranthiṣu prabho ||

The way of cessation of desire as suggested by the followers of Tāntricism is very peculiar. According to them it is desire itself by which the wise can remove desire. They tell us : 'Just as one takes out water from the ear with the water itself, or a thorn with a thorn itself, so the wise remove desire with desire itself. Just as a washerman makes a cloth clean by removing its dirt with some dirty matter, so a wise man makes himself pure only with what is impure. Or as a looking glass becomes clean when rubbed with dust, just so things which are offensive are for the annihilation of offence when enjoyed by the wise. A lump of iron when thrown into water surely sinks, but when flattened out and shaped into a vessel it not only floats on water but enables others also to do so. In the same way when the mind is strengthened by wisdom it remains free even while enjoying the things that men desire and at the same time helps others to obtain free-

nānyathā te 'khilaguro ghaṭeta karuṇātmanaḥ |
yas tu āśiṣa āśāste na sa bhṛtyaḥ sa vai vaṇik ||
āśāsāno na vai bhṛtyaḥ svāminy āśiṣa ātmanaḥ |
na svāmī bhṛtyataḥ svāmyam icchan yo rāti cāśiṣaḥ ||
ahaṃ tv akāmas tvadbhaktas tvaṃ ca svāmy anapāś-
rayaḥ |
nānyathehāvayor artho rājasevakayor iva ||
yadi dāsyasi me nātha varāṃs tvaṃ varadarṣabha |
kāmānāṃ hṛdy asaṃrohaṃ bhavatas tu vṛṇe varam ||

Bhāgavata Purāṇa, VII. 10.2-10.

dom. The object of desire when enjoyed by the unwise becomes a fetter to him, but to the wise the enjoyment does not work against liberation. Poison when taken in accordance with proper method acts like life-giving ambrosia ; but even good food, such as ghee, cake, etc. if taken improperly, acts like poison. Ghee mixed with honey in equal portion becomes poison, but the same thing taken according to rules becomes an excellent tonic saving one from the ravage of senility and disease. As copper blended with quick-silver becomes faultless gold, just so the impurities or passions (*kleśas*) to those who know what true knowledge is, are efficient in causing good.' [18]

[18] *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*, ed. Prabhubhai Patel, Visvabharati Series, 1933:

karṇāj jalaṃ jalenaiva kaṇṭakenaiva kaṇṭakam ।
rāgeṇaiva tathā rāgam uddharanti manīṣiṇaḥ ॥ 37
yathaiva rajako vastraṃ malenaiva tu nirmalam ।
kuryād vidvāṃs tathātmānaṃ malenaiva tu nirmalam ॥ 38
yathā bhavati saṃśuddho rajonirghṛṣṭadarpaṇaḥ ।
sevitas tu tathā vijñair doṣo doṣavināśanaḥ ॥ 39
lauhapiṇḍo jale kṣipto majjaty eva tu kevalam ।
pātrīkṛtaṃ tad evānyaṃ tārayet tarati svayam ॥ 40
tadvat pātrīkṛtaṃ cittaṃ prajñopāyavidhānataḥ ।
bhuñjāno mucyate kāmān mocayaty aparān api ॥ 41
durvijñaiḥ sevitaḥ kāmaḥ kāmo bhavati bandhanaṃ ।
sa eva sevito vijñaiḥ kāmo mokṣaprasādhakaḥ ॥ 42
yathaiva vidhivad bhuktaṃ viṣam apy amṛtāyate ।

Let us now turn to the Blessed One, the Buddha. What is the truth according to him? As we have seen, there is great difference as to what he actually taught. Scholars are still carrying on discussions over the point. Yet, it is agreed on all hands that the truth as propounded by him is *Anātman*—a doctrine diametrically opposite to that held by most of his predecessors.

But how could he arrive at that strange conclusion in the face of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of Ātman with which the atmosphere was so much surcharged? It seems to me that it is the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the Self itself that led him to arrive at such a decision. That desire is to be rooted out was his strong conviction, which was also the conviction of his predecessors. And he searched within himself where that desire is, where it comes forth, and to find what its cause is. It is evident in our daily experiences that whatsoever we love we desire. And the more we love it, the more we desire it. Now what do we love most in the world?

durbhuktaṃ ghṛtapūpādi balavat tu viṣāyate || 43
ghṛtam ca madhusaṃyuktaṃ samāṃśaṃ viṣatāṃ vrajet |
tad eva vidhivad bhuktam utkṛṣṭaṃ tu rasāyanam || 50
rasaspṛṣṭaṃ yathā tāmraṃ nirdoṣaṃ kāñcanaṃ bhavet |
jñānavidas tathā samyak kleśāḥ kalyāṇasādhakāḥ || 51

It is the Self. We can give up all that we have, but we tremble at the very idea of giving up the Self. Offer the kingdom of the heaven and tell a man that he may accept it, but only on condition that he shall give up his life. Certainly he would not accept the offer. What can he do with that kingdom when he himself is no more? So the greatest love we feel is for the Self, for there is nothing dearer than it. Therefore it is said in the Upaniṣad (Br. Up., I.4.8):

'It is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else, and nearer than anything. And if one were to say to one who declares another than the self dearer, that he will lose what is dearer to him, very likely it would be so. Let him worship the self alone as dear. He who worships the self alone as dear, the object of his love will never perish.'

In fact, the sole object of love is the Self. We love other things, no doubt, but it is only owing to its relation to them. In reality, loving others we love nothing but the Self, as the following passage of the Upaniṣad (Br. Up., II. 4. 5), which is very well-known to most of you, expresses very clearly:

'Verily it is not for the desire for a husband that husband is dear, but it is for the desire for the Self that the husband is dear. Verily it is not for the desire for a wife that the wife is dear, but

it is for the desire for the Self that the wife is dear. Verily it is not for the desire for a son that the son is dear, but it is for the desire for the Self that the son is dear. Verily it is not for the desire for wealth that wealth is dear, but it is for the desire for the Self that wealth is dear.' And so on.

Thus thinking over the nature of the Self as expressed in the above or similar passages of Upaniṣads some of our ancient sages resorted to a particular way of realizing it, as has been described in the first lecture, in order to put a final stop to suffering, and declared (Br. Up., II. 4.5) in the words of Yājñavalkya to his beloved wife Maitreyī:

'Verily the Self is to be perceived, to be heard, to be thought, and to be meditated, O Maitreyī, by perceiving, hearing, thinking, and understanding the Self all this is known.'

It is not that the Blessed One did not accept it. But his perception or realization of the Self was quite different from that of the actual followers of the Upaniṣads, though there was no difference with regard to the fulfilment of the purpose for which the realization of the Self is meant.

There is no doubt whatever that he felt that the greatest object of one's love is the Self, and necessarily the greatest desire one cherishes is for the Self. But he also felt that when there is

desire there must be its evil consequences—sufferings and miseries. He is reported to have said once to Visākhā (*Udāna*, VIII. 8) who just lost her very dear grandchild :

'Whatever grief, lamentation, or sorrow in different forms, there is in the world, is all due to love. If, however, there is no love, these are also not there. Therefore, those who have love nowhere in the world are free from grief and are happy. So one who wants what is stainless and sorrowless (*virāja* and *asoka*=*nirvāṇa*) should make love nowhere in the world.[19]

With this attitude of the mind and being strongly influenced by the idea of the transitoriness and sorrowfulness of the world, and thinking again and again over the characteristics of the Self, *viz.* independence, permanence, and blissfulness, as propounded by his predecessors in the Upaniṣads, he searched in his heart as to where that Self is. He found it nowhere. He perceived that Self is only in name or merely an idea (*prajñaptisat*), and not in reality (*dravyasat*). For,

[19] ye keci sokā paridevitaṃ vā
dukkhā ca lokasmim anekarūpā |
piyaṃ paticceva bhavanti ete
piye asante na bhavanti ete ||

tasmā hi te sukhino vītasokā
yesaṃ piyam n'atthi kuhiñ ci loke |
tasmā asokaṃ virajaṃ patthayāno
piyaṃ na kayirātha kuhiñ ci loke ||

that which is held to be the Self has not the nature described above. What is it then ? Nothing but the five *skandhas*, *viz. rūpa* 'material form,' *vedanā* 'feeling,' *saṃjñā* 'perception,' *saṃskāra* 'co-efficients of consciousnes,' and *vijñāna* 'consciousness.' He would analyse each of them and put searching questions to his disciples in order to bring home to them the actual truth about the Self. Here I should like to call your attention to the following passage in an abridged form, found in the Vinaya Piṭaka (*Mahāvagga*, I. 6.38-47) and either fully or partly in many other places in the canon :

"Then the Blessed One addressed the band of the five monks :

'The material form, O monks, is not the Self. If it were so, O monks, the material form would not be subject to sickness, and it would be possible to say of the material form "Let my material form be so and so, and not so and so." But inasmuch, O monks, as the material form is not the Self, it is subject to sickness, and it is not possible to say of it, "Let my material form be so and so, and not so and so."

On the other hand, as the material form, O monks, is not the Self, it is subject to sickness, and it is not possible to say of it, "Let my material form be so and so, and not so and so."

Now what do you think, O monks, is the material form, permanent or impermanent ?'

'Impermanent, Sire.'

'But is that which is impermanent, sorrow or joy ?'

'Sorrow, Sire.'

'Now that which is impermanent, full of sorrow, and subject to change, is it possible to say of it, "This is mine, this am I, this is my Self ?"'

'Certainly not, Sire.'

Similarly he dealt also with the remaining four aggregates (*skandhas*) : feeling, perception, co-efficients of consciousness, and consciousness, leading the monks to the same conclusion as with regard to the material form, that is, of none of them it is possible to say "This is mine, this am I, this is myself." Then he proceeded :

'Perceiving this, O monks, the learned and noble disciple feels an aversion (*nirveda*) for all the aggregates beginning with the material form, and feeling an aversion for them he becomes divested of attachment (*virāga*), and by the absence of attachment he becomes free, and when he is free he becomes aware that he is free, and he knows that rebirth is exhausted, that successful is his life that he has lived and his duty is fulfilled, and there is nothing for the world.'

Also from other discourses that he gave to his disciples from time to time it is evident that according to him there is no identity whatever of each of the aggregates with the Self (*rūpaṃ nātmā*,

etc.); nor is the Self with it (*rūpavān naiva ātmā*, etc.), like a tree with its shade; nor is it in the Self (*nātmani rūpam*, etc.), like fragrance in a flower; nor is the Self in it (*nātmā rūpe*, etc.), as a gem in a basket.[20]

Thus and in various other ways, too many to be mentioned, the existence of a permanent Self or Ātman, as accepted in other systems, was utterly denied by the Buddha, thereby pulling down the very foundation of desire where it can rest.

Mark here the trend of the discourse quoted just above which drives at emancipation through the absence of desire or attachment that arises from the notion of Ātman.

Now how this desire springs up owing to the notion of Ātman is shown very clearly in some passages, the substance of which I give below :

If one knows that really there is Ātman his notion of ' I ' (*ahaṅkāra*) does not disappear, and consequently one's suffering does not cease. For when there is the cause there is the effect. When a man sees that there is Ātman he identifies his

[20] SN, III. 3 (with the *Aṭṭhakathā*): rūpam attato samanupassanti, rūpavantam vā attānaṃ, attani vā rūpaṃ, rūpasmiṃ vā attānam, ahaṃ rūpaṃ mama rūpam.

SS, p. 21:

rūpaṃ nātmā rūpavān naiva cātmā |
rūpe nātmā rūpam ātmany asac ca ||

See Nāgārjuna's *Suhṛllekha* (*Friendly Epistles*) in the *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1886, p. 15 (verse 49).

body with it, and there arises his lasting love for it. This love rouses thirst for comforts and the thirst prevents him from realizing the deficiency of the objects he wants to enjoy. And he imagines the things that he desires to be good and loves to think that 'they are mine,' and adopts means for their attainment. When there is the notion of the Self, there arises also the notion of the other than the Self, and owing to this division of the Self and the other than the Self, there spring up the feelings of attachment and aversion, and being bound to these two all evils arise.[21] So one extols the Blessed One :

'If there is the notion of 'I' (*ahaṅkāra*) in the mind, the continuity of birth does not cease, nor goes away the notion of 'I' from the mind if there is the notion of Ātman. And there is no other teacher than you in the world advocating

[21] yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tasyāham iti śāśvatasnehaḥ ।
snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati, tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute ॥
gunadarśī paritṛṣan mameti tatsādhanam upādatte ।
tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat tu saṃsāraḥ ॥
ātmani sati parasaṃjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigraha-dveṣau ।
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante ॥
—Quoted as of Ācāryapāda (=Nāgārjuna) in the BAP, p. 492, as well as in the Commentary by Guṇaratna on the *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya*, Bib. Ind., p. 192. The last kārikā is quoted also in the AAA, p. 67.

the absence of Ātman. Therefore, there is no other way than your doctrine for deliverance.' [22]

So says Candrakīrtti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* (VI. 123): 'Having seen by wisdom all the passions and evils arising from the view of Ātman (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), and having also known that the object of it is Ātman, a Yogin denies its existence.'' [23]

And Śāntirakṣita tells us, that liberation follows the cessation of the notion of 'I' is an

[22] It is said to be of Stotrakāra (Mātṛceṭa). The original runs:

sāhaṅkāre manasi na śamaṃ yāti janmaprabandho
nāhaṅkāraś calati hṛdayād ātmadṛṣṭau ca satyām ।
nānyaḥ śāstā jagati bhavato nāsti nairātmyavādī
nānyas tasmād upaśamavidhes tvanmatād asti mārgaḥ ॥

—Quoted in TSP, p. 905; as an *āgama* in the Ṭīkā of *Āścaryacaryācaya* (wrongly named *Caryācaryaviniścaya*), ed. Hara Prasad Shastri in his *Bauddha Gāna o Dohā*, Vaṅgīya Sāhityapariṣad, 1323 B.S., p. 61; AK, IX, p. 230. See also the following stanza in Śilāṅka's Ṭīkā on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra*, Āgamodayasamiti, 1921. I. 1. 1 (p. 13 *a*).

mamāham iti caiṣa yāvad abhimānadāhajvaraḥ
kṛtāntamukham eva tāvad iti na praśāntyunnayaḥ ।
yaśaḥsukhapipāsitair ayam asāv anarthottaraiḥ
paraiṅ apasadaḥ kuto 'pi katham apy apākṛṣyate ॥

[23] satkāyadṛṣṭiprabhavān aśeṣān
kleśāṃś ca doṣāṃś ca dhiyā vipaśyan ।
ātmānam asyā viṣayaṃ ca buddhvā
yogī karoty ātmaniṣedham eva ॥

MA, VI. 120 ; MV, p. 340; see TS, 3489.

opinion held even by the heretics (*tīrthyas*). But this notion of 'I' does not cease if really there is the existence of Ātman.[24]

The denial of Ātman is called *nairātmya* 'the state of being devoid of Ātman.' Radically the word Ātman means 'nature' (*svabhāva* 'own being'), which never undergoes any change, nor depends on anything for its being. The Self is called Ātman, because, according to those who believe in it, it has the nature just described and of which it is never devoid, and necessarily it is held to be eternal. This *nairātmya* is two-fold: *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya*. *Pudgala* is nothing but what is known to us by such terms as *sattva*, *jīva*, *puruṣa*, and *ātman*, etc., that is, the Self. By *pudgalanairātmya* we understand that what is believed to be a *pudgala* or self has no independent nature of its own and consequently no existence in fact, and therefore it is not a thing in reality (*vastusat*), but exists merely in imagination as a name, a term, a designation, a convention for serving the purpose of ordinary life. Similarly the *dharmas* or things around us have not their *ātman* or nature, because they depend for their being on causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*). This is *dharmanairātmya*.

Desire, the cessation of which is sought for, naturally requires for its very being both a subject

[24] TS, 3493.

and an object. Therefore, while by *pudgalanairātmya* its subject is denied, it is *dharmanairātmya* that removes its object. Thus, there being neither the subject nor the object, there is no room for desire to come forth, and therefore none for its evil consequences, sorrows and miseries.

When we find the Blessed One often declaring that these three worlds are only *citta* or *vijñāna* 'consciousness,'[52] we approach a very important and influential section of his followers, known as Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins. They are believed to have truly expounded the significance of that and similar utterances of the Buddha. They declare that the only real thing is 'consciousness' which is momentary, and they utterly deny the existence of all external things which are said to be just like the phantoms created in dream-state. They explain to us also the two-fold *nairātmya*, *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya*, just referred to. Passions, *i.e.* desire and the rest of them (*rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ*) spring up from a conception of ātman (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) and as such disappear when there is realization of *pudgalanairātmya*; by the realization of *dharmanairātmya* vanishes away the ignorance about the *dharmas* or things which are, in fact, not what they appear to us being only the transformations

[52] cittamātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam. See *Daśabhūmikasūtra* ed. Rahder, p. 49 ; *Viṃśikā* ed. Lévi, p. 3; MA, VI. 23 (p. 181); SS, p. 9; VM, p. 43.

of consciousness. This ignorance is an obstruction, and like darkness covers the knowable, *jñeya* (*i. e. tathatā*), and is thus called *jñeyāvaraṇa*.[26] The passions (*kleśas*) referred to above, are also regarded as a 'cover' (*kleśāvaraṇa*), for they, too, obstruct the realization of the truth.

Again, when the Blessed One is reported to have often declared that the things are void, (*śūnyā eva dharmāḥ*) [27] we seek the help of another school of his followers, equally important and influential, *viz.* the Mādhyamikas. This school, too, leads us to the same place, *viz. nairātmya*, both *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya*, otherwise called *pudgalaśūnyatā* and *dharmaśūnyatā* respectively. For, as the teachers belonging to this school hold, there is nothing real, as everything is devoid of its innate or independent nature, and that being the case everything that appears before us depends for its being on cause and conditions. It cannot therefore be said that there is anything in its own or innate form (*svarūpa*). We see a thing, no doubt, but it appears before us only in its imposed (*āropita*) form, and not in its own form (*svarūpa*).

There arises a question : If a thing visible to us is only in its imposed form, of what kind

26 The Mādhyamikas would, however, explain it, as in BAP, IX. 55 (p. 447), saying that the knowable itself is a cover being mere imposed (*samāropita*).

27 KP, p. 94.

is it then in reality ? What is its own form (*sva-rūpa*)? The answer is, it is *dharmatā* 'the state of being a *dharma* 'thing.'[28] But what is *dharmatā*? Own being (*svabhāva*). What is 'own being?' Nature (*prakṛti*). And nature? That which is called voidness (*Śūnyatā*). What does voidness mean? The state of being devoid of own-being (*naiḥsvābhāvya*). And what are we to understand by it ? That which is 'suchness' (*tathatā*). What is this 'suchness?' Being of such nature (*tathābhāva*), that is, the state of being not liable to change (*avikāritva*), the state of permanent existence (*sadaiva sthāyitā*).[29]

To be more clear, *svabhāva* of a thing means only that which is independent of another (*para-nirapekṣa*) and consequently natural (*akṛtrima*), and thus having not been before it does not come

[28] *dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā* is generally translated as ' the element of elements.'

[29] yadi khalu tad adhyāropād bhavadbhir astīty ucyate kīdṛśam tat. yā sā dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā nāma saiva tat-svarūpam. atha keyaṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā, dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaḥ. ko 'yaṃ svabhāvaḥ, prakṛtiḥ. kā ceyaṃ prakṛtiḥ, yeyaṃ śūnyatā. keyaṃ śūnyatā, naiḥsvābhāvyaṃ. kim idaṃ naiḥsvābhāvyam, tathatā. keyaṃ tathatā, tathābhavo 'vikāritvaṃ sadaiva sthāyitā. sarvadānutpāda eva hy agnyādīnām paranirapekṣatvād akṛtrimatvāt svabhāva ucyate. MV, pp. 264-265.

For the explanation of *tathatā* see *Madhyāntavibhāga-sūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā*, ed. V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci, Calcutta, 1932, p. 41 (I. 15-16); *Triṃśikā*, ed. Lévi, p. 21.

into being (not *abhūtvā bhāvaḥ*). Therefore, the *svabhāva* of fire is nothing but its non-origination (*anutpāda*), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having not been at first. Thus there appears nothing, nor does anything disappear; nothing has an end, nor is anything eternal; nothing is identical, nor is there anything differentiated; nothing comes hither, nor goes anything thither only there being Dependent Origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), where cease all one's expressions (*prapañcopaśama*).

Viewing things in this light these teachers, the propounders of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, declare that anything, external or internal, that appears to us as existing, is, in fact, unreal, and just like the imaginary town in the sky (*gandharva-nagara*). Thus there being nothing, internally or externally, the notion of 'I' and 'mine' (*ahaṅkāra* and *mamakāra*), technically known as *satkāyadṛṣṭi*,[30] disappears completely, as there is neither the subject nor the object of the

30 The term *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, Pali *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, is explained variously according to various derivations of *satkāya*. Mainly the following two derivations are possible : (*i*) *sat-kāya*, and (*ii*) *sva-kāya*. With regard to the first (*i*), *sat* in *sat-kāya* may be derived from the roots (*a*) √*as* 'to be' meaning 'existing,' and (*b*) √*sad* 'to perish' meaning 'perishing.' The latter is supported by both Tibetan and Chinese reading *ḥjig* and *hoái* respectively. The literal meaning in the first case of *satkāyadṛṣṭ*

notion. The disappearance of this notion is followed by the disappearance of *saṃsāra*, which has its roots struck deep in it. Thus the sole object of the followers of the *śūnyatāvāda* is to root out the notion of ' I ' and ' mine ' or the Self and that which belongs to the Self (*ātman* and *ātmīya*), or in other words, *satkāyadṛṣṭi*.[31]

is the view (of *ātman* and *ātmīya*) on the existing body (or collections, *skandhas*) ; and in the second, the view (of *ātman* and *ātmīya*) on the perishing body. As regards the second derivation, *sva-kāya*, it is suggested by Childers and others that Skt. *sva-kāya* becomes in Pali first *sa-kāya* and then *sakkāya*, the *k* being reduplicated just as from *anudaya* we have *anuddaya* in Pali. According to Prof. Walleser the derivation is *svat-kāya* (from which Pali *sakkāya*) *svat* being for *sva*. *Cf.* *tvad*, *mad* (to which *yad*, *tad*, *anyad*, etc. may also be added). In support of this view, as pointed out by Prof. Walleser, *cf.* also *Kathāvatthu*, PTS, p. 86: *anuppattasadattha* with *anuprāptasvakārtha* in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Bib. Ind., p. 3 ; MVt, 18-12 ; *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Bib. Ind., p. 23. In favour of *svakāya* see Nāgārjuna, MK, XXIII. 5, where *svakāyadṛṣṭi* is used, and Chandrakīrtti explains it thus: svakāye dṛṣṭir ātmātmīyadṛṣṭiḥ. Therefore, the meaning is the belief of ' I ' and ' mine ' on one's own body or *skandhas*. For further details see ZDMG, Vol. 64, pp. 581 ff., and Poussin: AK, V, p. 15.

The *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is termed variously with different shades of the meaning as *ātmavāda*, *ātmagrāha*, *ātmadṛṣṭi*, and *ātmābhiniveśa*.

For its consequence see BAP, p. 492; MV, p. 361, SS, p. 247.

31 MV. p. 340: ādhyātmikabāhyāśeṣavastvanupalam-

As to why this doctrine of *anātman* or *śūnyatā* is so much insisted upon, I may place before you the following lines from a very old text: [32]

'One who believes in the void is not attracted by worldly things, because they are unsupported. He is not delighted by gain, nor is he cast down by not gaining. He does not feel proud of his glory, nor does he shrink from lack of glory. Scorn does not make him hide, nor does praise win him; he feels attached neither to pleasures, nor does he feel aversion to pain. He who is not so attracted by worldly things knows what the void means. Therefore one who believes in the void has neither likes nor dislikes. He knows that to

bhena adhyātmaṃ bahiś ca yaḥ sarvathāhaṅkāramamakāraparikṣaya idam atra tattvam. kāyadṛṣṭimūlakam eva saṃsāram anupaśyaṃs tasyāś ca satkāyadṛṣṭer ālambanam ātmānam eva samanupaśyann ātmānupalambhāc ca satkāyadṛṣṭiprahāṇaṃ tatprahāṇāc ca sarvakleśavyāvṛttiṃ samanupaśyan prathamataram ātmānam evopaparīkṣate.

[32] *Āryadharmasaṅgītisūtra* as quoted in ŚS, p. 264: na śūnyatāvādī lokadharmaiḥ saṃhriyate 'niśritatvāt. na sa lābhena saṃhṛṣyati, alābhena vā vimanā bhavati. yaśasā na vismayate 'yaśasā na saṅkucati. nindayā nāvalīyate praśaṃsayā nānunīyate. sukhena na rajyate duṣkhena na virajyate. yo hy evaṃ lokadharmair na saṃhriyate sa śūnyatāṃ jānāti. tathā śūnyavādino na kvacid anurāgo na virāgaḥ. yasmin rajyate tac chūnyam eva jānīte, śūnyam eva paśyati. nāsau śūnyaṃ jānīte yaḥ kvacid dharme rajyate vā virajyate vā. tathā nāsau śūnyatāṃ jānīte yaḥ kenacit sārdham vigrahaṃ vivādaṃ vā kuryāc chūnyam eva jānīte śūnyaṃ paśyatīty ādi.

be only void which he might like, and regards it as only void. He who likes or dislikes anything does not know the void, and he who makes quarrel or dispute or debate with any one does not know this to be only void nor so regards it.'[33]

What we gain by the doctrine of anātman has been explained by Nāgārjuna in this way:[34] When there is no ātman and when the notion of ātman disappears, the notion of *ātmīya* 'mine' also necessarily disappears (as the parts of a chariot are also burnt when the chariot itself is burnt, and as such they cannot be found out).[35] When the notion of both ātman and ātmīya ceases one becomes free from the idea of 'I' and 'mine' (*nirmama* and *nirahaṅkāra*). When this idea of 'I' and 'mine' vanishes both internally and externally, all the holdings up (*upādānas*), *viz.* desire (*kāma*), wrong views (*dṛṣṭi*), belief in rites (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*), and soul theories (*ātmavāda*) also vanish, and this extinction of holding up is followed by that of birth. Thus karmas and passions being extinct *mokṣa* is obtained.

33 Trans. by Bendall and Rouse, slightly modified.

34 MK, XVIII. 2-5:

ātmany asati cātmīyaṃ kuta eva bhaviṣyati |
nirmamo nirahaṅkāraḥ śamād ātmātmanīnayoḥ ||
mamety aham iti kṣīṇe bahirdhādhyātmam eva ca |
nirudhyata upādānaṃ tatkṣayāj janmanaḥ kṣayaḥ ||
karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ |

35 As explains Candrakīrtti.

Now in connection with the extinction of the notion of 'I' and 'mine,' which leads to liberation, as shown above from the Buddhist point of view, we are reminded of what has been said in the *Bhagavadgītā* (II. 71) : 'The man who forsakes all desires, and being free from yearnings and devoid of the notion of 'I' and 'mine' marches onwards, attains peace.'[36]

The whole religious literature of India is replete with this idea, and therefore it is useless to dilate further upon the point. Yet, let me quote the following couplet from Narahari's *Bodhasāra* (in the section *Jñānagaṅgātaraṅgiṇī*, 14) :

ahantāmamatātyāgaḥ kartuṃ yadi na śakyate ।
ahantāmamatābhāvaḥ sarvatraiva vidhīyatām ॥

"The idea of 'I' and 'mine' is to be given up, but if you cannot do so, then you should apply the idea everywhere."[37]

Thus we have seen that for the fulfilment of the common object, *viz.* the extinction of desire, while the followers of the Upaniṣdas laid all stress on the perception of ātman which according to them is eternal (*nitya*) and pure bliss (*ānanda*,

36 vihāya kāmān yaḥ sarvān pumāṃś carati niḥspṛhaḥ ।
nirmamo nirahaṅkāraḥ sa śāntim adhigacchati ॥

37 The compound word *ahantāmamatābhāvaḥ* is ex plained by the Commentator, Divākara, a disciple of the author, taking the last member of the compound as *abhāvaḥ*, but evidently it cannot be accepted.

sukha), the Buddha totally denied its very existence by his doctrine of anātman, according to which there is no ātman in its accepted sense, and which holds everything to be impermanent (*anitya*), and as such the cause of pain (*duḥkha*), and which emphasises that that which causes pain cannot be ātman. We have also seen that it is the extinction of desire round which has directly or indirectly centered all that is said by the Buddha as well as by his followers.

Indeed, by his denial of the very existence of a permanent soul, the Buddha took a very bold and peculiar step, and, I am sure, most of you will raise questions in connection with it as did king Milinda in his dialogue with the venerable Nāgasena in the *Milindapañha* (II. I. 1). The king asked him : 'If, most revered Nāgasena, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is it, pray, who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging and necessaries for the sick ? Who is it who enjoys such things when given ? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness ? Who is it who devotes himself to meditation ? Who is it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvāṇa of Arhat-ship ? And who is it who destroys living creatures ? Who is it who takes what is not his own ? Who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies, who drinks strong drinks, who (in a word) commits any

one of the five sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life? If that be so, there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor causer of good or evil deeds; there is neither fruit nor result of good or evil karma. If, most revered Nāgasena, we are to think that were a man to kill you there would be no murder, then it follows that there are no real masters and teachers in your Order, and that your ordinations are void.'

These and such others are the objections against the denial of the soul, and for the sake of convenience they can briefly be stated as follows:

That which comes into being one day and vanishes the next day or at some other time is impermanent and that also is impermanent which is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), that is, which undergoes changes every moment. That everything changes every moment is a fact, and it was well-known long before the Buddha: but while his predecessors made an exception with regard to the soul (*kṣaṇa-parivartino hi bhāvā ṛte citiśakteḥ*), the Buddhists carried it to the furthest extreme. In dealing with the Buddhist position, by impermanence we are to understand this momentariness.

Now, if there be no permanent individuality, and if everything is momentary, there can in no way be any relation between a man and his action and its consequence (*karmaphala-sambandha*). For a man who performs an action at one moment does not remain the same at the moment when

the consequence thereof is to be experienced. In the same way the man who experiences the consequence cannot have been the agent of the action, both the moments being different. And it follows from the above that an action though actually performed does not produce any result, and is thus lost (*kṛtanāśa*), and that while there is a consequence there is in fact no action at all (*akṛtāgama*).

Again, there is no possibility of the relationship of cause and effect (*kāryakāranabhāva*). For, it is neither the past nor the future cause that can produce an effect. Nor is it the present cause for it cannot remain so for long, being only for a moment. Similarly there cannot be bondage or liberation. Nor are possible recollections (*smṛti*) or recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), or any decision preceded by doubt (*saṃśayapūrvaka niścaya*). Nor can a man search for a thing that he might have laid down somewhere (*nihitapratyanumārgaṇa*). Nor does also exist the possibility of satisfying the curiosity that one might have entertained after having seen a desirable thing (*kutūhalavirati*).

As too much has been said or written either against or in favour of the problem before us, and as this is not the occasion for a detailed discussion, I should like to offer you only two main arguments by which the adherents of the doctrine of anātman meet the objections raised against them as mentioned above.

The first argument consists in the regularity of the relationship of cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇa-bhāvapratiniyama*), and if that can be demonstrated satisfactorily as existing there would then be no room for the question of the intervention of the soul, for in that case there would be absolutely nothing for it to do.

In Buddhism the law of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)[38] is well-known. It shows that the origination of a thing depends only on its cause and conditions. In order to make it clear let me quote an example. If there be a good seed, and favourable conditions, the sprout invariably comes out from the seed, and from the sprout comes the leaf, from the leaf the joint, from the joint the stalk, and so on, gradually up to the fruit. Evidently here there is nc intervention of ātman, there being nothing for it to do. If there were no seed nor the conditions, such as earth, water, heat, air, space, and season, there would be no sprout, nor leaf, etc. Now when there is the origination of the sprout from the seed, the seed does not think : 'I cause the sprout;' nor does the sprout think : 'I am caused by the seed.' Similarly the earth and the other conditions referred to above do not think : 'We do our respective functions with regard to the origination of the

[38] It is the same as the 'Law of Relation to This' (*idampratyayatā*), and the 'Law of Elements' (*dharma-saṅketa*). See belcw, and p. 90, notes 43, 44.

sprout ;' nor does the sprout think : 'I am caused by these conditions.'[39]

Again, the sprout is produced not by itself (*svayaṅkṛta*), nor by another (*parakṛta*), nor by both (*ubhayakṛta*), nor by God (*Īśvarakṛta*), nor from the Primeval Cause (*prakṛtikṛta*), nor is it owing to the transformation due to time (*kāla-pariṇāma*), nor is it dependent only on one cause (*ekakāraṇādhīna*), nor is it produced without any cause (*ahetu*).

This Dependent Origination does not involve the question of permanency (*śāśvata*), or annihilation (*uccheda*), or transition (*saṅkrānti*). There is no identity of the seed and the sprout, for clearly they are two different things ; and it is evident that when the seed is destroyed the sprout comes into being. Thus it cannot be held that in the origination of the sprout there is any permanency. Nor can it be said that there is annihilation, for the sprout comes into existence from the seed which is neither wholly destroyed nor wholly undestroyed ; the fact is that the moment the seed is being destroyed the sprout comes into being, just as the rising up and coming down at the same moment of

[39] na ca pratyayasāmagryā janayāmīti cetanā |
na cāpi janitasyāpi janito 'smīti cetanā ||
BA, VI. 26.

Evidently this is based on the *Śālistambasūtra* quoted in Mahāyāna works: BAP, pp. 481, 577 ; SS, pp. 220, 225 ; MV, pp. 562, 566.

the two ends of a balance. Again, as the seed is one and the sprout another it cannot also be held that there is transition.

Now as the external (*bāhya*) matter, such as the sprout referred to above owes its existence to nothing other than the law of Dependent Origination, so also in exactly the same way the internal (*ādhyātmika*) matter, *i.e.*, the things constituting the body and mind of what is known to be an individual, depends for its being solely on the same law of Dependent Origination without any supervention of the self.

In accordance with the two aspects, *viz.* external and internal, the law of Dependent Origination is also of two kinds, external and internal.

Now what are the constituent parts of the so-called individuality? By analysis we find mainly two things, *nāma* (Skt. *nāman*) and *rūpa*. These two words are generally translated by 'name' and 'form' respectively, which, however, is not correct. It is quite true that in the Upaniṣadic texts [40] these two terms convey the above meanings, but in Buddhist literature they are employed in quite different senses. By *nāma* we understand primarily the mind (*citta, vijñāna, manas* 'consciousness') and secondarily the mentals (*caitasika dharmas*), *i.e.*, feeling, perception, and the co-efficients of

40 For instance, Ch. Up., VI. 3, 2-3 ; VII. 14. 1.

consciousness (*vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra*). As the mind with the mentals 'inclines' (*namati*) towards its objects, it is called *nāma*.[41] The word *rūpa* in this connection literally means the thing that 'suffers oppression' (*rūpyate = bādhyate*), and 'suffering oppression' implies 'change.' Therefore that which undergoes change owing to cold, heat, etc. is *rūpa*. Others are of opinion that that which is 'susceptible to resistance' (*pratighāta*) is *rūpa*.[42]

Therefore the words *nāma* and *rūpa* may be translated by 'mind' and 'matter' respectively. For 'mind' we may use 'spirit' also.

41 *Sammohavinodanī*, PTS, p. 135 · namatīti nāma; *Visuddhimagga*, Simon Hewavitarane Bequest, 1920, p. 394 : namanalakkhaṇaṃ nāmaṃ sampayogarasaṃ; p. 419 : ārammaṇābhimukhaṃ namanato. But see MV, p. 544 : tatra karmakleśāviddhaṃ tasmin tasminn upapattyāyatane nāmayatīti nāma, saṃjñāvaśena vārtheṣu nāmayatīti nāma. It means that because being thrown by *karma* and *kleśas* it makes itself incline towards different places of birth it is called *nāma*. Or because through perception it makes itself incline to the objects it is called *nāma*.

42 SN, III, p. 86; AK, I, p. 24. It may be noted here that there are two roots: (*i*) √*rūp*, cl. 10, *rūpayati*, from which we have *rūpa* 'form,' 'shape,' colour 'beauty' etc.; and (*ii*) √*rup*, cl. 4, *rupyati*, 'to suffer violent pain.' It is used in Vedic and Pali texts. From *rupyati* Pali is *ruppati*. It is connected with the root √*lup*. From this √*rup* are derived *ropa* 'confusing, disturbing,' *ropaṇa* 'causing bodily pain.' In the formation and meaning these two roots are confounded.

Thus the so-called individual is nothing other than these *nāma* and *rūpa*, or in other words, the five *skandhas*.

These *skandhas*, just like the sprout, etc. must have their cause and conditions without which their existence is in no way possible. In brief, the cause is ignorance (*avidyā*), from ignorance springs bad and evil actions of body, mind, and speech, or lust, hatred, and delusion (*saṃskāras*), as others say, from them the consciousness (*vijñāna*), and so on up to death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection, and despair, as in the Twelve-fold Chain of Causation (*dvādaśāṅga nidāna*).

The conditions are the six elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. Each of them has some special function, as for instance, it is the element of earth that causes the hardness of the body. The function of the element of water is to bind together the body. To assimilate the food and drink is the function of the element of fire. And so on. Now, as before, ignorance does not think: 'I cause the action of the body, mind, and speech;' nor do these actions think: 'We are caused by ignorance.' Similarly these conditions do not think that they cause those particular functions of the body; nor is there any thought on the part of the body that those functions are performed by the conditions. Yet, when these conditions, the elements of earth, etc. are unimpaired the body comes into being from their union. Here

in the body the element of earth is not ātman or self or a living being, not a man, not a woman, not a neuter; and not I, not mine, nor any one else's. So also with the elements of water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. Thus all questions relating to individuality are solved by the law of Dependent Origination and no room is left for the intervention of Self. Let me quote here the following words of the Blessed One addressed to his disciples:

'There are, O Bhikṣus, action and retribution; but there is found no agent that abandons these *skandhas* and takes others, excepting the 'Law of Elements' (*dharmasanketa*).[43] And this is the Law of Elements: that being, this is; by the origination of that, the origination of this.'[44]

43 Stcherbatsky in his *Central Conception of Buddhism*, 1923, p. 28, translates the term by 'Theory of Elements.' According to Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* on AK, IX, p. 260, as pointed out by Poussin *dharmasaṅketa* is *pratītya-samutpādalakṣaṇa*, and *saṅketa* is *hetuphalavyavasthā* (III, p. 18). The word *saṅketa* may literally be translated by 'convention.'

44 iti hi bhikṣavo 'sti karma asti phalaṃ, kārakas tu nopalabhyate ya imān skandhān vijahāti anyāṃś ca skandhān upādatte, anyatra dharmasaṅketāt. atrāyaṃ dharmasaṅketo yad asmin sati idaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadayta iti.

This passage with some unimportant variations are often quoted: BAP, p. 474; MSA, XVIII. 101; TSP, pp. 11, 173. See MV, p. 9; AK, V. 27.

And in this connection the great commentator of Pali works, Buddhaghosa, cites the following stanza in his *Visuddhimagga* (p. 513) embodying the final decision of the philosophical system he represents :

dukkham eva hi na ca koci dukkhito
kārako na kiriyā ca vijjati |
atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā
maggam atthi, gamako na vijjati ||

'Only sorrow is there, but not an afflicted man. There is action, but not the agent. There is *nirvāṇa*, but not one who realizes it. And there is way, but not he who goes thereby.'

Now the second argument that I want to advance is with regard to meeting the objections raised against the theory of momentariness, in accordance with which there is no identity of a man even in two succeeding moments, though the identity is absolutely necessary for recollection, recognition, and so on, as has already been shown.

This contention of the opponents rests solely on the assumption that the succeeding moments are altogether different from each other. But the fact is not so. The Buddhists would say that they are neither identical nor different (*na anyaḥ, na cānanyaḥ*). In order to make the point perfectly clear I should like to quote the following passage from the *Milindapañha*, II. 2 (p. 40) :

The king said: 'He who is born, Nāgasena, does he remain the same or become another?[45]

'Neither the same nor another.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby,...lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?'

'No. That child was one, I am another'

'If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher......what great king! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third or the fourth? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off?'

'Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that?'

The Elder replied: 'I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.'

'Give me an illustration.'

45 yo uppajjati so eva so udāhu aññoti.

'Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through?'

'Yes, it might do so.'

'Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?'

'No.'

'Or the same that burns in the second watch, and another in the third?'

'No.'

'Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third?'

'No. Through the connection with the same (lamp) it burns all the night through.'[46]

'Just so, O king, by the continuity of the elements (*dhammasantati*), which are put together, one comes into being, another passes away; and the link is, as it were, simultaneous. Therefore neither as the same, nor as another it arrives at the last consciousness (of the life).'[47]

Let me give you another extract from the same work, II. 2.6 (p. 46):

The king said: 'Who is it, Nāgasena, that is reborn?'

'Mind-and-matter is reborn.'

46 taṃ yeva nissāya sabbarattiṃ padīpito.

47 evam eva kho mahārāja dammasantati sandahati, añño uppajjati añño nirujjhati, apubbaṃ acarimaṃ viya sandahati, tena na ca so na añño pocchimaviññāṇasaṃgahaṃ gacchati.

'What, is it this mind-and-matter that is reborn?'

'No; but by this mind-and-matter deeds are done good and evil, and by these deeds (this karma) another mind-and-matter is reborn.'

'If that be so, Sir, would not that man be released from the evil karmas?'

'Yes, if he were not reborn. But just because he is reborn, O king, he is therefore not released from the evil karmas.'

'Give me an illustration...'

'Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage and give the nuptial gift (*suṅka*, *śulka*) for her and go away. And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to give the nuptial gift for her and marry her. And when the first one has come back he should say: "Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?" And the other were to reply: "It's not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and gave the nuptial gift for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and gave nuptial gift, is another." Now, if they, thus disputing were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?'

'In favour of the first.'

'But why?'

'Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, she has grown out of the first girl.'

'Just so, great king, it is one mind-and-matter which has its end in death, and it is another in rebirth. But the second is derived from the first. Therefore he is not free from the evil deeds.'[48]

It is thus, I hope, clear from the above that there being the regularity of the relationship of cause and effect, as well as the law of Continuity of Elements (*dharmasantati*), so far as I have been able to elucidate in the limited scope of the present lecture, there is nothing that can demand the intervention of ātman.

Thus by eradicating the notion of 'I' (*ātman*) and 'mine' (*ātmīya*) the Buddha struck at the very root of *kāma* 'desire,' rightly described as Māra 'death,' without the extinction of which none can aspire to the realization of NIRVĀṆA.

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[48] Eng. tr. in SBE, slightly modified.

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